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Workers or mothers?

Czech welfare and gender role preferences in transition

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Abstract

Two decades after the fall of state socialism, the Czech Republic records the widest employment gap between women with and without pre-school children among OECD countries: 41 pp. Several substantial parental leave reforms took place during the first stage of the transition (1995) and after the EU accession (2008). The responses by the targeted population, i.e. take-up rates and duration of work interruptions, do not fully mimic predictable effects drawn by financial incentives. Why is that? Using the European Values Study and the Generations and Gender Programme panel data, I show that quite counter-intuitively, in the context of post-socialist public policy adjustments, preference for long leaves does not stem from lower preference for welfare state institutions, but from a purely intra-household value change in favour of higher task specialization between men and women. Indeed, unlike most European countries and even other post-communist countries, we observe a significant turn towards specialized couple preferences - among both women and men, both parents and non-parents, and both the higher and lower educated.

Key words: Family policy, Gender roles, Culture, Central and Eastern European transition

JEL codes: J16, Z10, P52

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1. Introduction

Difficulties in balancing work and family in European households have received increasing political and academic attention over the past decades. The European Commission recommends increasing support to pre-school childcare as a tool to increase female participation rates. Maternal employment in the Czech Republic has been decreasing in such proportions (contrasting with relatively high full-time employment rates of women outside reproductive age), that the employment gap between women with and without pre-school children ranges as the highest among all the OECD countries[2] (OECD, 2011). This is due to one of the longest paid parental leaves in the world: four years per child, accessible universally to all Czech parents. Despite the parental benefits outlasting the job-protected leave and being paid a low flat rate equivalent of 20% of the average wage, 34.7%[3] of mothers were still inactive after 3 years of leave in 2007.

This family policy setting and its outcomes ask for further investigation. What explains this preference for very long leaves? A lot has been going on in the background of Czech households. Among the most prominent contextual changes which accompanied the redefinition of work-family balance, we can cite the transition to democratic policy and market economy initiated in 1989, a competitive labour market, changes in standards of living, exposure to Western Europe resulting in the 2004 European accession. How have Czech households and policy makers reacted to these changes? Beyond economic motives, family-related decisions seem particularly prone to being influenced by alternative arguments, due to their inherent embeddedness in social structures. Forming a couple, forming a family, childbearing, caring, working, breadwinning; these are social identities as much as they are activities with immediate economic implications. If we assume that these normative features are likely to influence households' behaviours and economic outcomes, they need to be included in our understanding of the recent evolutions in family policies and practices. Previous research suggests that Czech households' response to parental leave reforms deviated from sole financial incentives (Mullerova, 2014; Mullerova, 2016) and additional explanations point towards the underlying family and gender attitudes. The purpose of this paper is therefore to

[2] See the comparative chart in Appendix (Figure A)
[3] Own calculations using the Labour Force Survey 2007, last year before the PL was restructured.

propose a descriptive essay on these attitudes and their evolution in the post-transitional society, and to discuss their explanatory power.

Drawing on sociological traditions, economists have long recognised the importance of social identities (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), transmitted from generation to generation within given cultures, in explaining micro- and macro-level economic behaviours. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) define culture as "those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation" (p. 23). Alesina and Giuliano (2015) note in their survey that although beliefs (priors) and values (preferences) are distinct concepts, economic literature mostly deals with them together under the generic term of culture. This cultural identity, or mentality (Senik, 2014) enriches economic models and usually relies on the assumption that it is a "given" throughout one's lifetime (Becker, 1996). However, authors argue that beliefs and values can be progressively updated through experience and/or moved from one equilibrium to another following temporary shocks, and that is also the starting point of many studies applied to communist and post-communist countries.

Given the kind of cultural norms related to maternal choices between employment and childcare leave, I will focus here on the literature which deals more specifically with gender issues and attitudes. Fernandez (2007), in her cross-country analysis of attitudes towards women and work in the second half of the 20th century, excludes Czechoslovakia and other communist countries precisely because of their "profound transformations in the economies, institutions and cultures" (p. 8). The transformations occasioned by the 1989 transition to democracy and market economies in the former eastern bloc are mostly studied with respect to the case of reunited Germany, due to its quasi-experimental setting[4]. Neckert and Voskort (2014) study family values among other, and conclude that not only are they differentiated between West and East, but they are also transmitted as significantly different to the first post-transitional generation. To that respect, they confirm Olivetti's et al. (2013) finding that a woman's work decisions are positively affected by her mother's work decisions, and that the intergenerational channel is very strong. Bauernschusters and Rainer (2012), as well as Campa and Serafinelli (2015), show that women in Eastern Germany have more positive attitudes towards work than in Western Germany. Lippmann et al. (2016) also use the German divide to study gendered attitudes, in particular with respect to the intra-household division of tasks as

[4] For a more general approach to culture, see Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) for their work on welfare preference differences between East and West Germany.

related to the differences in contribution to household income. They use the sociological concept of "doing gender" (West and Zimmerman, 1987), i.e. displaying socially accepted female and male roles in order to avoid deviations from conformity, which are costly in terms of social identity. The authors reverse the inequality inertia embedded in this concept, and focus instead on a case of "undoing gender", and show that East Germany developed a culture in which still today, women are less inclined to neutralise their higher share of household income by increased home production. Beyond the borders of Germany, Campa and Serafinelli conclude that in general Eastern European countries developed as less traditional in terms of gender equality. While this paper challenges this result - with respect to intra-household and family tasks - and its persistence in the post-transitional Czech Republic, this brings us to the last body of literature on family policy regimes and their conceptions of the gender-based division of market and home production.

Inspired by the seminal work by Esping-Andersen (1990), further typologies have included gendered social roles (Lewis 1992). Post-communist Czechoslovakia joined the typologies as a conundrum of high full-time female participation, strongly "refamilising" policies with respect to childrearing resulting in a drastic decline in public childcare for children aged 0 to 3 and very long maternal inactivity spans (Haskova and Uhde, 2009; Saxonberg and Sirovatka, 2009; Sobotka 2015). This paper draws on this literature on refamilising trend in Czech work-family reconciliation policies and practices. It uses declared individual attitudes in order to account for this observed trend and to highlight gendered attitudes on the micro level, thanks to the European Values Study and the Generations and Gender Programme data.

I show that rather than welfare state preferences, the Czech preference for long leaves and active mothering correlates with attitudes with respect to female/male tasks division. Quite counter-intuitively, in the context of post-socialist public policy adjustments, household preferences for refamilisation do not stem from lower preference for welfare state institutions, but from a purely intra-household change in favour of higher task specialisation between men and women.

The paper is organised as follows: After presenting the Czech institutional context (Section 2) as well as the data and the empirical methods (Section 3), I present the results and their interpretation (Section 4), before concluding (Section 5).

2. Context

Before focusing on attitudes, it is necessary to consider the broader institutional framework. Haskova (2011) underlines the limits of a preference-based interpretation of work-family arrangements, and it is reasonable to assume that although individual preferences do account for differentiated work-family strategies, they do so within a framework of what is made possible by various institutions, such as the duration of paid job-protected parental leave and the availability of affordable and quality childcare. These institutions, unlike values and beliefs, are directly observable through documentation on family policy.

As mentioned previously, Czech family policy evolution is described as "refamilising" (Haskova and Uhde, 2009; Saxonberg and Sirovatka, 2009; Sobotka 2016), i.e. that which aims at shifting to lower public intervention and higher involvement of families in dealing with social needs. This is particularly visible in public childcare provision: After 1989, the number of nurseries decline by 95% during the first few years (Kucharova, 2009). Nurseries already suffered from a very bad reputation in the communist era (Matejcek, 1974), and the transition to market economy is an occasion to remove the remaining public support and financing. Political support to EU's Barcelona targets on developing pre-school childcare remains to this day so weak, that the Minister of Labour and social affairs addressed them in a speech during Czech's EU presidency[5] and stated that CEE countries would have opposed their formulation had they been EU members at the time. As early as 1989, the disappearance of childcare for children under the age of 3 was accompanied by an extension of paid job-protected parental leave until this 3-year threshold. In 1995, the parental benefit was even extended to 4 years per child – without extending the 3-year job protection – and it remained universal and conditioned only by mothers' inactivity on the labour market and full-time personal care (no kindergarten allowed). In the 2000s, i.e. in the context of the surveys considered here, the PL scheme remained the one implemented by the 1995 reform: 4 years of parental benefits paid a flat rate 20% of the average wage, which outlast the 3 years of job-protected leave. In 2008, the multi-speed reform introduced shorter tracks (2 and 3 years), with outcomes visible from 2009 onwards. As to childcare, major changes had been accomplished by the end of the 1990s: nurseries for children under the age of 3 had virtually disappeared, and kindergartens for children aged 3 to 5 were, due to shortages, focused mainly on full-time care for 4-year olds

[5] In February 2009, Petr Necas.

and 5-year olds. In terms of the work-family arrangements model (Borck 2014), this situation fits the equilibrium with zero childcare, low fertility and low participation (i.e. low maternal participation, overall female participation being close to the European average over the period). It is only in the late 2000s, at the occasion of EU accession, that this refamilising trend is reversed and progressive adjustments in favour of maternal employment are made[6]. At the same time, fertility was largely considered an individual matter into which policy should not intervene, an attitude buttressed by the broader context of "ideologically induced animosity towards the institutions and policies of the welfare state" linked to the acute memory of communism (Potucek, 2001, p.102).

In practice, what is described as "refamilising" is synonymous with "regenderising", given that with no ambiguity family tasks are attributed to women in this family policy setting: job-protected parental leave is not accessible to fathers until 2001, and take-up has not exceeded 1% since. There was no paternal leave in the Czech system in the 1990s and the 2000s, yet a bill discussing 7-day paternity leave is being considered for 2017. Therefore, the post-transitional refamilising turn promoted a specialised couple type of household, in which work-family reconciliation is reached through successive periods of activity (outside childbearing) and inactivity (from age 0 to 3 or 4 for each child). Saxonberg (2013) touches upon the explanatory limits of the familising/defamilising dichotomy, and the Czech case is particularly noteworthy in this respect. Saxonberg defines genderising policies as "policies that promote different gender roles for men and women", while degenderising policies "promote the elimination of gender roles" (p. 8). Indeed, although the two concepts overlap, the distinction is important especially in a post-communist country, where refamilisation resonates as a shift in values with respect to the welfare state, from collective to individual solutions to social needs. However, Saxonberg's typology suggests - and this paper will demonstrate it - that welfare is not the crucial element of the work-family values change in the post-transitional Czech Republic: Gender is. The table 1 sums up policy trends before and after the systemic transition as well as after the EU accession in 2004.

[6] For a detailed list of family policy measures in the second part of the 20th century, see Table B in Appendix. For more information, see Haskova and Uhde (2009).

Table 1 Family policy trends with respect to gender roles

Family policy tools	Pre 1989	Post 1989	Post 2004
Support to childcare	**Degendered**: large network of nurseries	**Gendered**: Nurseries (0-2) close, only kindergartens remain	**Degendered**: EC recommendations, higher coverage
Parental leave	**Gendered** : Additional maternity only	**Gendered**: Parental leave but no incentive for fathers	**Degendered**: EC recommendations, paternal leave

We note that Czech family policy has until 2004 been oriented towards conservative gender-based tasks division, with the exception of the development of nurseries in the previous regime which aimed at increasing maternal employment accordingly to the communist ideology and its labour force needs. The orientation changed with the EU accession, when the Czech policy makers half-heartedly embraced the EC recommendations and started applying marginal change to parental leave and childcare policies. However, the change in political discourse and family policy measures, although it indicates a shift in the political elite's attitudes (Scharle, 2015), does not exhaust the question of gender attitudes and specialised/undifferentiated couple preferences, given that responses to parental leave reforms seem to indicate persistently and increasingly a preference for long maternal leaves. In order to highlight theses preferences and in line with the important and over-looked aspect of gender conservatism in Czech family policies, I will for the remainder of this paper turn to qualitative micro-data and establish that there has indeed been a clear conservative turn in gender attitudes.

3. Data and Empirical strategy

3.1 Data

The data used are the European Values Study (EVS) 1999 and 2008 for the comparative analysis, and the Generations and Gender Programme (GGP) 2005 and 2008 for the detailed panel analysis of the Czech family values. They both contain opinions with respect to family and gender issues, although GGP also provides additional opinion questions on interactions between parents, partners and children, as well as opinions on the responsibility of the Welfare State in these matters. Combining the two datasets allows us to retrieve values from the first

transitional decade (1999) and to extend the time horizon of the observed trends, although the datasets are only comparable to a limited extent. The EVS also allows me compare the Czech family culture to the rest of Europe and more specifically to its nearest neighbours with the most similar institutions and socio-economic situations (Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, together with the Czech Republic, are commonly called the "Visegrad four"), as GGP only covers Hungary and Poland in the first wave and none in the second wave.

The European Values Study is a large-scale longitudinal survey on social values, with four waves between 1981 and 2008 on more than 40 countries. The dataset is comparable with the widely known World Values Surveys and the integrated dataset covers 113 countries. The Czech Republic was surveyed in 1991, 2000 and 2008, but I only use 2000 and 2008 as many variables are missing in the first wave and the purpose of this dataset here is to frame and benchmark with the findings of the GGP, which only covers the late 2000s. Each wave of the EVS is composed of approximately 2000 individuals, whose characteristics are described in table B in Appendix. The variables used are opinions on market/home production specialisation in the couple, and they include the following statements: "In case jobs are scarce they should go to men", and "Fathers are as well suited to look for children as mothers". Surprisingly, the answers rank from *Strongly agree*, *Agree*, to *Disagree* and *Strongly Disagree*, with no neutral response option. The answers to the second question were inverted before analysis, in such a way as to respect the order from a traditional, specialised couple with genderised opinions (Yes, jobs should be left to men, and No, fathers are not as well suited for care as mothers) to an undifferentiated, liberal couple with de-genderised opinions (No, jobs should not be left to men, and Yes, fathers are as well suited for care as mothers). The inverted item is therefore equivalent to the statement "Fathers are *less suited* to look for children than mothers". For the clarity of the interpretation, the four values are all standardised to a 0-1 range, where 0 is very genderised and 1 is very degenderised.

The GGP is a longitudinal study of 19 European countries, initiated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. It comprises a contextual database and 3 waves of individual data, based on a rich questionnaire on relations between men and women and across generations which is harmonised and comparable across countries (Vikat et al., 2007). Currently, two waves are available: 19 countries for the first wave, 10 countries for the second. There is no third wave in the Czech Republic[7]. In the first wave in 2005, 10 006 individuals

[7] Only Austria, France, Hungary, the Netherlands and the Russian Federation are concerned (UNECE, 2014).

were interviewed in the Czech Republic. Due to attrition, 3151 were interviewed in 2008 and therefore the balanced panel is composed of 6302 observations. Characteristics of the sample selected by attrition do not differ significantly from the rest. They are reported in the descriptive statistics in Appendix[8]. The age range of the panel goes from 17 (21 in the second wave) to 79 years old. 71% (73%) of the sample are parents, and 43% (44%) are mothers. As dependent variable, I build an indicator which serves to assess the evolution of attitudes about gender-based division of tasks in the household. It combines four statements: "It is bad for the couple if a woman earns more", "Daughters should take care of their parents more than sons", "In case of a divorce children should stay with the mother", "In case jobs are scarce they should go to men" (the last item is also present in EVS). These are 5-level Likert items, and answers are ranked from *Strongly agree, Agree, Neither,* to *Disagree* and *Strongly disagree*. Agreement with these statements is interpreted as preference for a strong gender division, specialised couple, and conservative/traditional attitudes. Disagreement with the statements can then be described as preference for a weak gender division, undifferentiated couple, and liberal attitudes. There are other questions with a gender context in GGP, but there are left aside for several reasons. First, some of them are not present in both waves. Such is the case of the very interesting item "A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his/her mother works". Secondly, some do not have a straightforward interpretation in terms of market versus home production specialisation. For instance, studies point on the ambiguity of the statement "Children often suffer because their father concentrates too much on work" (Buber-Ennser and Panova, 2014). "Men make better political leaders than women" and "In a couple men should be older than women" seem to go beyond the carer-breadwinner distinction. However, when they are included in an extended indicator, the results do not change. Similarly, I build a larger indicator which zooms out of couple specialisation and includes more generally the family-oriented items that individuals express in relation to their partner and children, which comprises the GGP questions which relate to "family values strength" (Meurs and Lucifora, 2012). It includes not only the couple specialisation variables, but also more general family values such as "A marriage is a lifetime relationship and should never be ended", or "A children needs both a mother and a father to grow up happily".

Finally, a third indicator is built, which synthetises people's preference for family versus society in addressing their social needs. It is called the family/welfare indicator and it includes questions on care and cash provisions for the following social needs: "Care for pre-

[8] See Table B for EVS and Table C for GGP.

school children", "After-school care", "care for elderly", then "financial support for young living below subsistence level" and "financial support for old people living below subsistence level". The answers are ranked from *Mainly family* to *More family than society*, *Both equally*, to *More society than family*, and *Mainly society*. The scale has also been standardised 0-1, with 0 being defined as very familised (comparable to very genderised in the gender indicator) and 1 as very defamilised (very degenderised in the gender indicator). Last but not least, I use a subjective assessment of the household's economic situation, defined as the 6-level Likert item "The household is able to make ends meet" *With great difficulty, With difficulty, With some difficulty, Fairly easily, Easily and Very easily*. The scale has also been standardised to 0-1. Compared to the EVS, the panel dataset GGS presents the advantage of reporting not only family values, bud also welfare preferences. With respect to the economic literature on cultural values and transitional countries, it appears helpful to investigate these preferences and their distribution. We can benchmark the results with a case study applied to France (Lucifora and Meurs, 2014), which relates welfare preferences to the strength of family ties. The data on welfare/family preferences, presented in the previous section on data, include questions on care for pre-school, after-school care, care for elderly, financial support for youth in need and financial support for elderly in need. The responses rank from *mostly family* to *mostly society* and are standardised 0 to 1. Surprisingly enough, the mean value for care provision for the three questions are almost identical between the Czech Republic and France, while for cash transfers the Czech mean value is strikingly higher, i.e. closer to preference for welfare at the expense of family.

Table 2 Family/Welfare preferences in 2005

	Czech Republic	**France**
Care for pre-school	0.25	0.27
After-school care	0.31	0.3
Care for elderly	0.41	0.39
Financial help for youth	0.74	0.62
Financial help for elderly	0.71	0.64
Obs.	10.006	9.977

Source: GGP 2005
Note: Country-level average of answers to the question "Who should provide car/cash for…". Answers are ranked from *Mostly family* (coded 0) to *Mostly society* (coded 1).

With this battery of qualitative variables on family/welfare preferences, family ties and gender attitudes, completed with individual demographic and socio-economic characteristics, I investigate the distribution of these preferences across countries and within the Czech

population, as well as their evolution over time, in order to provide possible insights on the phenomenon of persistent and very long maternal leave preference. I take into consideration the entire population and their views, as I am interested in the overall cultural atmosphere in which households take their work-family reconciliation decisions. Social control and majority attitudes are an important part of social identity, and I therefore explore gender attitudes of the overall adult sample, with further subsampling along the road. This choice also allows me to hint on heterogeneities with a higher number of observations.

3.2 Empirical strategy

In order to pin down the evolution in values with respect to work/family balance, I focus on gender attitudes and complement with family/welfare preferences and family ties in general. As said above, the concepts of genderising/degenderising attitudes (or familising/defamilising), conservative/liberal and specialised/undifferentiated couple will be used as synonyms. By doing so, I provide evidence on the specific re-genderising evolution of Czech attitudes, which is extremely rare over that period on the European continent. In order to overcome limitations inherent to comparing repeated cross-sections and to explore in more detail the underlying mechanism, I then turn to panel data. Indeed, due to the cross-sectional structure of the EVS, any evolution observed in the mean might be attributable to unobserved changes in the population. Although descriptive statistics show no significant evolution in the structure of the population that would differ from their neighbours and therefore account for the difference in patterns, there might be other unobservable variables affecting the sample's composition and therefore attitudes.

Recentering on the Czech Republic, I first use the GGP 2005 to focus on the family/welfare indicator and to show the specificity of childbearing norms, compared to other social needs, as being more family oriented and less heterogeneous along individual socio-economic characteristics. Indeed, I compare the correlation between family/welfare preferences and household wealth for different social needs, and I highlight the specificity of childcare, as an argument to claim that the gendered role of childcarer is at least as laden with social normativity as it is with economic considerations. OLS and ordered probit estimations are used. The panel data then allow me to confirm the relevance of gender attitudes observed

in cross-sectional data by using fixed-effect regressions and therefore better accounting for the evolution of gender attitudes and its determinants. I estimate the following equation:

$$GenderIndic_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 TimeDummy_{it} + \alpha_2 Age_{it} + \alpha_3 Wealth_{it} + \alpha_4 Educ_{it} + \alpha_4 NumberChildren_{it} + \alpha_4 MaritalStatus_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

The main dependent variable is the gender attitudes indicator, for which lower values indicate more genderised (traditional, conservative, specialised couple) preferences. I use the within estimator to regress the indicator's value for each individual on the time variable – the 2008 value as compared to 2005 – while controlling for time variant individual characteristics age, wealth, education, number of children and marital status. The coefficient of interest is then α_1, associated with the year of interview. It captures the trend in gender attitudes between 2005 and 2008, purged of fixed effects and controlling for aforementioned observables. These were selected as possible structural explanations of the evolution: as the individuals in the sample get older (by 3 years), complete their education, maybe get richer, possibly get married and have children, this might drive the result. The persistence of the evolution despite these controls is then interpreted as a significant normative change across the Czech population and independent of structural effects.

After the main analysis, the sample's ageing as a possible factor of the conservative turn is addressed. As a last point in arguing that gender attitudes are the vector of post-transitional changes in work-family strategies, I show that none of previous results hold if the gender attitudes outcome is replaced by a generic family values indicator: no significant changes would have been observed had we failed to isolate the gender perspective.

4. Results

4.1. International Comparison

The first step in understanding the pattern of Czech family values is to compare them with other countries which had and had not experienced the communist regime. With respect

to gender-based specialisation, I selected two variables in EVS with a straightforward interpretation: one on the male's role, the other on the female's role. They concern the statements "When jobs are scarce, they should be left to men" and "Fathers are less suited to look for children than mothers", and as presented in the Data section, they are coded from 0 (*Agree*, i.e. traditional) to 1 (*Disagree*, i.e. liberal).

The following charts 3.1 and 3.2 compare the 29 countries which I observe in both waves of the survey, 1999 and 2008. They indicate the respective position of a country in 1999 and the evolution between 1999 and 2008, as well as the sample's mean in 2008 and the Czech mean in 2008. What we observe, first of all, is a general trend towards more liberal gender attitudes for both questions and in the absolute majority of countries. To the item "When jobs are scarce, they should be left to men", the answers rank from a traditional view (*agree*, coded 0) to a liberal view (*disagree*, coded 1). The change for the overall sample is positive and significant, +4.39 percentage points. The countries with a significant change (always positive, Greece and Czech Republic being the only exceptions with a significant negative change), are marked with an asterisk.

Figure 1 When jobs are scarce, they should be left to men (EVS)



Source: EVS 1999 and 2008

Note: The values rank from *Agree* (0, traditional) to, *Neither* (0.5) and *Disagree* (1, liberal). Recorded on individual level, they are averaged at a country-level with app. 1500 individuals per country. For a given country, an asterisk represents the significance of the difference between 2005 and 2008, estimated by controlling for a set of basic individual characteristics (sex, age, number of children).

Although it ranges between Great Britain and France in 1999, Czech evolution differs drastically after that: other countries with a similar composition of gender attitudes experience a liberalising turn, while for the Czech Republic there is a notable move towards a more conservative view. Only Greece records a steeper decline, and Czech Republic and Greece are only joined by Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Ukraine as countries who did not become significantly more liberal over the period.

Even among the Visegrad-four countries, the Czech gender attitudes have become by far the most conservative. In Poland and Hungary, the trend is similar to the general European one - although the former is among the most traditional to begin with, while the latter is above the European average in both periods. Slovakia has the most similar pattern, yet it is to be noted that the change is substantially milder and non significant. The similarities with Slovakia are expected, as the two countries shared unified political and economic contexts until the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 and had followed similar family policy orientation after that (in the years 2000s, same 28-week duration of maternity leave, 3 years of parental benefits in Slovakia and 4 years in the Czech Republic, and same steep decline in childcare for 0-3 year olds).

As to paternal and maternal care, the observation is similar, as shown in the figure 2. The overall change is positive and significant. Most of the countries get more liberal in the second period - even those with high initial values - yet the Czech Republic does not. Even more significantly, the Czech Republic ranks the lowest of all the countries in 2008.

Figure 2 Fathers are less suited than mothers to take care of children (EVS)



Source: EVS 1999 and 2008

Note: The values rank from *Agree* (0, traditional) to, *Neither* (0.5) and *Disagree* (1, liberal). Recorded on individual level, they are averaged at a country-level with app. 1500 individuals per country. For a given country, an asterisk represents the significance of the difference between 2005 and 2008, estimated by controlling for a set of basic individual characteristics (sex, age, number of children).

While the European trend goes towards more active paternal roles, with extensions of paternity leave entitlements across the continent[9], the Czechs consider that a father is not substitutable with a mother in childrearing. This finding is fully in line with the local family policy orientation: When the Social Democrats' association on gender equality suggested a debate in 2013 on paternity leave, the project was castigated by the media and by the Social Democratic party itself (a Social Democrat MP calling it a "social engineering"[10] attempt); the project was abandoned until 2015.

In order to assess whether this evolution is or is not a broader post-socialist feature, let us consider the Visegrad four (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary). Here too, the

[9] See Ekberg et al. (2013) on the Swedish paternity leave, although Scandinavian countries are not the only European region endowed with paternity leave schemes.

[10] http://zpravy.idnes.cz/navrhy-cssd-k-rodinnemu-zivotu-dm8-/domaci.aspx?c=A130511_115409_domaci_hv
http://thinkgender.eu/blog/2013/05/29/delena-rodicovska-dovolena-a-kvoty-ruku-v-ruce-proti-duchu-ceskych-tradic/

Czech Republic stands out as the most re-gendering country. Hungary observes a liberalising turn between 1999 and 2008, and Slovakia and Poland, although they also progress towards more traditional couple attitudes, still rank higher than Czech Republic in both 1999 and 2008. Among other post-communist countries, such as the Baltic countries, Slovenia, Russia, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria or Eastern Germany, none re-gender their child rearing attitudes.

Therefore, the gender attitudes appear to have undergone a peculiar development in the Czech Republic, and invite further investigation. In the following section, I turn to the GGS panel data, which allow me to confirm whether the conservative turn is observable even while controlling for individual fixed effects, and therefore to offer more interpretation as to its underlying mechanisms.

4.2 Czech Republic

In this analysis, I use the two GGP waves from 2005 and 2008 and I argue that they took place outside of any significant shock, most importantly before the outburst of the world economic crisis. Its impacts on the Czech economy only became perceptible in 2009: from 2.7% in 2008 the GDP growth went down to -4.8% in 2009, and the unemployment rate went from 4.4% in 2008 (actually lower than in previous years) to 6.7% in 2009 (CZSO, 2016). Therefore, the evolutions that we will observe can be, for lack of exogenous shock, interpreted as part of a larger trend in the Czech society.

Before getting into panel analysis, the descriptive comparison with France showed that the post-socialist Czech Republic does not exhibit a particularly higher preference for welfare in terms of care provision, while it does rely more heavily on society for the provision of financial support. This finding is to be related to the literature comparing respective preferences for welfare in the post-transitional reunited Germany (Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007; Campa and Serafinelli, 2015). They note that the legacy of preference for welfare in Eastern Germany, plausibly due to exposure to communist ideology and an interventionist social state, remains significant and strong after the end of the regime. In the same way, we can interpret the Czech's higher expectation for public expenditure as a legacy of the former exposure to comprehensive social policy and safety nets. In their study on Russian welfare preferences after the transition, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) highlight the relation between preference for welfare and income: Poorer individuals tend to rely more on welfare provisions, while being

better off is more associated with reliance on family. Furthermore, welfare/family preference can be predicted by the expected economic situation in the future. For the provision of services, while individuals on an upward trajectory express preference for family, individuals on a downward trajectory prefer society. Our analysis confirms the significant correlation between wealth[11] and preference for family/welfare, but most interestingly, introduces a differentiation with respect to the targeted population. If the welfare provision aims at young adults or elderly, the preference for welfare is stratified by wealth. Yet if it aims at childcare, we observe no correlation whatsoever with household's economic situation. In the following table 3, OLS estimates are reported. Covariates on age, gender, education, number of children and marital status do not change the result (Table D in Appendix, and the scope and the significance of the different results are confirmed by ordered probit estimations (Table E in Appendix).

Table 3 Correlation between family/welfare preference and wealth

	(1) Pre-school care	(2) After school care	(3) Elderly care	(4) Cash support youth	(5) Cash support elderly
Wealth	0.00468 NS	0.0115 NS	**-0.0723*** **	**-0.0985*** **	**-0.0670*** **
	(0.0234)	(0.0220)	(0.0225)	(0.0208)	(0.0201)
Constant	0.311***	0.242***	0.428***	0.760***	0.790***
	(0.0112)	(0.0106)	(0.0109)	(0.00985)	(0.00965)
Observations	3,031	3,041	3,039	3,043	3,043
R-squared	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.008	0.004

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: GGS 2005
Note: Family/welfare preferences are ranked from *mainly family* (coded 0) to *mainly society* (coded 1). Wealth is a 6-level Likert item on subjective perception of financial situation, values also standardised from 0-1.

And indeed, this confirms that the study of welfare preferences is mostly relevant here in its link with childcare. A significant absence of correlation with income suggests that childcare preferences go beyond the dichotomy between preferences for state and family and their economic determinants, and tend to be distributed more homogeneously across a population and more independently of socio-economic individual characteristics. Also, it is

[11] Measured as self-assessment of "the difficulty to make ends meet".

interesting to note that these welfare preferences do not correlate with gender preferences in any significant way[12], and, mostly, that these family/welfare preferences do not evolve over the period, be it with or without additional explanatory variables. The table 4 reports the results of fixed effect regressions, where the dependent variable is the family/welfare preference indicator, regressed on the time change (value in 2008 compared to the one in 2005), while controlling for time variant individual characteristics:

Table 4 Evolution of family/welfare preferences over time

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	**Family/Welfare preference**			
			Men	Women
2008 vs 2005	0.00419 NS	0.00313 NS	-0.00312 NS	0.00763 NS
	(0.00394)	(0.00416)	(0.00629)	(0.00561)
Constant	0.489***	0.486***	0.425***	0.550***
	(0.00279)	(0.0182)	(0.0248)	(0.0272)
Covariates	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,197	6,197	2,898	3,299
R-squared	0.000	0.007	0.018	0.014
Number of id	3,151	3,151	1,480	1,684

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: GGP 2005
Note: Family/welfare preferences are ranked from *mainly family* (coded 0) to *mainly society* (coded 1). Results obtained with a within estimator, controlled for time variant individual characteristics age, wealth, education, marital status and number of children.

The results of the regressions reported in tables 3 and 4 are relevant for our analysis by pointing towards the specificity of the social needs related to childbearing in the sense that they do not respond predictably to economic arguments the way other social needs do (3.3), and by showing that family/welfare preferences in general are stable over our period of interest and therefore don't yield explanations on the observed changes in work-family reconciliation policies and practices. This invites us to further focus the analysis on maternal care and market/home production specialisation, through the gender attitudes indicator. The charts 3.3 below show the distribution of gender attitudes in the four items of the indicator, and their evolution between 2005 and 2008. The position of the red line (2008, full marker) above the

[12] See Table F in Appendix.

blue line (2005, hollow marker) on the left side of the chart (conservative responses), and symmetrically under the blue line on the right side of the chart (liberal responses), represents the shift towards more gender-conservative attitudes.

Figures 3 The distribution of gender attitudes for men and women, in 2005 and 2008

Variable 1 "When jobs are scarce, they should be left to men"



Variable 2 "It is not good if a woman earns more than the man in the couple"



Variable 3 "A child should stay with his mother in case of divorce"



Variable 4 “A daughter should take care of her parents more than a son”



Note: Lower values are associated with a preference for a traditional, specialised couple; higher values are associated with a preference for a modern, undifferentiated couple.
Source: GGP 2005-2008

This descriptive representation hints that gender preferences, unlike welfare preferences, have evolved between 2005 and 2008. Indeed, the fixed effect regression results in the table 5 show that this evolution towards a more specialised (traditional) couple is significant for both women and men. The gender attitudes indicator is regressed on the time change, while controlling for time variant individual characteristics.

Table 5 Changing gender attitudes between 2005 and 2008, fixed effect regression

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Dependent variable: **Gender attitude indicator**					
	All		Women		Men	
2008 vs 2005	**-0.0262*** **	**-0.0270*** **	**-0.0209*** **	**-0.0203*** **	**-0.0325*** **	**-0.0359*** **
	(0.00357)	(0.00372)	(0.00479)	(0.00492)	(0.00534)	(0.00567)
Well-off		-0.0307***		-0.0440***		-0.0166
		(0.00857)		(0.0118)		(0.0125)
Married		0.0527**		0.0793**		0.00560
		(0.0238)		(0.0316)		(0.0364)
Primary Educ			*Reference Value*			
Second. Educ		0.00160		-0.0180		0.0255*
		(0.0108)		(0.0153)		(0.0155)
Tertiary Educ		0.0362*		0.00920		0.0660**
		(0.0201)		(0.0296)		(0.0275)
No children			*Reference Value*			
1 child		0.0250**		-0.0113		0.0693***
		(0.0120)		(0.0163)		(0.0180)
2 children		0.0704***		0.0516***		0.0877***
		(0.0129)		(0.0178)		(0.0189)

3 children		0.0792***		0.0381*		0.120***
		(0.0166)		(0.0223)		(0.0250)
Age: 21-30			*Reference Value*			
Age: 31-40		-0.00101		-0.00130		0.00699
		(0.0116)		(0.0149)		(0.0182)
Age: 41-50		0.0171		0.0158		0.0210
		(0.0137)		(0.0177)		(0.0214)
Age: 51-60		-0.00939		-0.0141		0.000879
		(0.0118)		(0.0150)		(0.0188)
Constant	0.528***	0.454***	0.532***	0.480***	0.522***	0.437***
	(0.00252)	(0.0170)	(0.00338)	(0.0251)	(0.00377)	(0.0233)
Observations	6,257	6,257	3,335	3,335	2,922	2,922
R-squared	0.017	0.039	0.011	0.041	0.025	0.053
Number of id	3,151	3,151	1,685	1,685	1,480	1,480

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: GGP 2005-2008
Note: Results obtained with a within estimator, controlled for time variant individual characteristics age, wealth, education, marital status and number of children.

The significant negative effect of "time" on the gender attitudes indicator shows that there is a trend towards more conservative gender-attitude, with a change by 2.7 percentage points between 2005 and 2008. But before going any further, there may be a legitimate concern about the evolution in beliefs in the panel being caused mechanically by the sample's growing age (given the three-year interval between the interviews). Indeed, the cross-sectional perspective shows a positive correlation between age and specialised couple preferences[13]. However, as we can see in Table 5 above, ageing does not account for the entire change in beliefs, given that adding age as a covariate in the panel regressions does not decrease the significance nor the scope of the observed regenderising evolution. Also, the EVS comparison between 1999 and 2008, showing a striking increase in specialised couple preference in both related variables, compares two samples with similar mean ages (47,6 and 48,3).

Therefore, the conservative turn is established, but the questions remain: Who carries the evolution and why? Firstly, we observe that both men and women respond more conservatively in 2008. Education does not seem to play a role as a covariate: However, the fixed effect regression only captures the effect of changing categories between the two periods and not the effect of *being* in a category on the reported opinions. Therefore, I turn to a

[13] See Table G in Appendix.

subsample analysis, where the population is divided in two halves, lower and higher educated. The result in the table 6 confirms the surprising relative homogeneity of gender attitudes evolution in this post-transitional period. Although the lower educated represent the largest part of the regenderising trend, the higher educated are also getting significantly more conservative.

Table 6 Gender attitudes between 2005 and 2008 by education, FE regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Dependent variable: **Gender attitude indicator**			
	Lower educated		Higher educated	
2008 vs 2005	**-0.0305*** **	**-0.0294*** **	**-0.0160***	**-0.0165***
	(0.00411)	(0.00413)	(0.00868)	(0.00887)
Well-off		-0.0301***		-0.0418**
		(0.0105)		(0.0176)
Constant	0.520***	0.453***	0.568***	0.522***
	(0.00287)	(0.0179)	(0.00609)	(0.0371)
Observations	5,087	5,087	1,132	1,132
R-squared	0.022	0.047	0.007	0.025
Number of id	2,673	2,673	668	668

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: GGP 2005-2008. Note: Results obtained with a within estimator, controlled for time variant individual characteristics age, wealth, education, marital status and number of children. Only the significant ones are displayed here.

Therefore, if lower educated (and especially men) are the most in favour of specialised couples, the rest of the population also embraces this trend. This finding interrogates the role of education and its predictable effects on gender equality attitudes: If we approximate education with labour market attachment, then higher education is expected to increase women's opportunity costs of long parental leave and therefore promote liberal attitudes with respect to gender-based task division (i.e. a more undifferentiated couple). If we relate education to income and wealth, then, under the plausible assumption that educated women tend to live in households with partners with similar characteristics, higher education means higher income households and therefore less pressure towards the dual-earner setting. This results in an opposite prediction: Higher education then "allows" for more specialised couple attitudes by alleviating the budget constraints. These two competing predictions are based on different cultural representations. The latter prediction assuming that very long leaves (for mothers who can afford them) constitute revealed preferences as opposed to the financially

constrained (or even legally obliged during communism) labour market participation. Judging the validity of these two hypotheses is outside the scope of this paper. However, the examples of family policy reforms in 1995 and 2008, where higher educated women also massively respond to the benefit extension beyond job-protected leave (1995) and do not return via shorter tracks in higher proportion than lower educated mothers (2008), suggest that the educational channel likely conveys both mechanisms.

It is interesting to note that when the sample is split along the median age (48 years) and the change in values estimated separately for the younger and older cohorts of both higher and lower educated, the effect remains present and significant for the younger half of both higher and lower educated and is even slightly higher for the higher educated (-2.7pp*** versus -2.4pp***). This is to be linked to the fact that younger cohorts, in general, seem to be driving the effect at least as much as older cohorts, as is shown in the Table 7.

Table 7 Gender attitudes between 2005 and 2008 by cohorts, FE regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	Dep. Variable: Gender attitude indicator		
	40 and less	41 to 60	60 and more
2008 vs 2005	**-0.0230*** **	**-0.0215*** **	**-0.0231*** **
	(0.00815)	(0.00738)	(0.00780)
Well-off	-0.0370***	-0.0249	-0.0174
	(0.0140)	(0.0161)	(0.0197)
Married	0.0471	0.0682*	0.0916
	(0.0365)	(0.0403)	(0.0829)
Constant	0.528***	0.462***	0.377***
	(0.0249)	(0.0360)	(0.0515)
Observations	2,362	2,278	1,617
R-squared	0.027	0.069	0.045
Number of id	1,286	1,346	921

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: GGP 2005-2008
Note: Results obtained with a within estimator, controlled for time variant individual characteristics age, wealth, education, marital status and number of children. Only the significant ones are displayed here.

Indeed, contrary to what we could have assumed on the gender attitudes of the younger generation in reproductive age, they are also getting more traditional. When we take into

account their fertility, interesting patterns emerge. First of all, heterogeneity analysis by number of children is insignificant, but it is very clear that individuals under 40 years old with no children are particularly subject to the conservative trend: they record a 3.85pp decrease significant on a 1% level. On the other hand, when I assemble individuals who had a child between the two waves in order to assess the effect of parenthood on their values, we observe no evolution towards conservative values. There is a considerable amount of self-selection to be addressed, but it is worth noticing that from all family settings (no children or a given number of children throughout the observed period, first child or another extra child between 2005 and 2008), individuals with two children, i.e. either from the beginning or transiting to a second child between the two waves, maintain the highest level of liberal views from one wave to another. The data lacks sufficient information on childbearing intentions and the ideal family size (the questions are heavily filtered and only apply to a small sample), but when I combine the item "Intention to have another child in 3 years" in 2005 and effective transitions to another child by 2008, the population with an unrealised childbearing intention gets strikingly more conservative than the average: the change reaches -5.4pp***. It calls for further investigation, but nonetheless it appears that in the youngest cohort of adults, the evolution towards conservative gender attitudes is established and is to be associated with low fertility and unrealised intentions. This supports Matysiak's analysis (2011) of low fertility in Central and Eastern Europe as response to intensified tensions between female labour market attachment (both a cultural legacy of the previous regime and dual-earner financial constraint on households paying the social costs of transition) and unsupportive family policy promoting poorly paid long leaves and long exclusively maternal care which increased the cost of children. In the Czech Republic, the total fertility rate has not exceeded 1.5 over the last 20 years (CZSO, 2016), and Saxonberg and Szelewa (2007) analyse the Czech family policy with the straightforward concern that one can only support the family if there are families to support. In the context of economic uncertainty and increasingly competitive labour market, it is indeed likely that individuals postpone childbearing as a constrained decision and express the gap between their work-family intentions and realisations through leaning towards a declarative traditional preference as a social identity beacon – given that they have more control over their "beliefs about the state of the world" than over the actual state of the world (p.307, Akerlof and Dickens, 1987).

Last but not least, in order to support my assumption that that there is an identifiable evolution of gender attitudes within the work-family culture which explains the refamilising

trend in policies and practices, I consider an alternative family values indicator. If in search for explanation of preferences for increasingly long leaves we were to look into family values defined in this general way, this is what we would have observed:

Table 8 Family values over time, fixed effects

VARIABLES	(1) **Family ties**: Weak (0) to Strong (1)	(2)
2008 vs 2005	-0.00459 NS (0.00253)	-0.00515 NS (0.00268)
Covariates	No	Yes
Observations	6,197	6,197
R-squared	0.001	0.012
Number of id	3,150	3,150

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: GGP 2005-2008
Note: Results obtained with a within estimator, controlled for time variant individual characteristics age, wealth, education, marital status and number of children.

Indeed, when the gender perspective is diluted among more general family values, the results disappear[14]. This robustness check confirms that gender attitudes, i.e. the undifferentiated/specialised couple preferences, seem to be the main driving forces of social changes related to family and childbearing.

5. Conclusion

Through the insight into cultural values data in 1999, 2005 and 2008, we have witnessed Czechs' gender attitudes evolving unambiguously towards a more specialised couple preferences. Indeed, unlike most European countries and even other post-communist countries, we observe a significant conservative turn - among both women and men, both parents and

[14] Detailed results of these regressions are in Table H in Appendix.

non-parents, and both the higher and lower educated. This finding sheds light on the broader context of work/family conflict and maternal employment determinants.

In the context of transition from communism and with respect to the existing literature, the evolution of gender attitudes along with the relative stability of welfare preferences is an interesting precision on the mechanisms at stake. Are Czech women workers or carers? A discrepancy appears between childbearing years and the rest of the life cycle. In contrast to traditionally high full-time female participation outside the reproductive age, mothers of children until the age of 4 have been increasingly reluctant to return to the labour market and have specialised as carers, leaving the breadwinner priority to their male counterpart. Previous research establishes the preference for very long maternal leaves across the Czech population (Mullerova 2014, Mullerova 2016), and the conservative turn in intra-household task division stands out as its likely underlying mechanism. If this paper answers a question, it undoubtedly raises another. The scope of the analysis cannot go beyond speculations as to the reasons *why* this trend appeared; the available data can only be used to show that controlling for various individual characteristics in fixed effects estimations does not exhaust the significance of the result and therefore does not explain the phenomenon. The timing of the two GGP waves (2005 and 2008) is such that no explanatory shock occurred, and we are left to interpret this change as part of a broader, long-term trend. We can discuss the role of the EU accession in May 2004 – it might be considered as having diffuse effects perceptible in 2008, but not yet in 2005. Yet if anything, that would lead us to underestimate the results, given that the cultural norms promoted at the European Union level are de-familising and de-genderising. An alternative interpretation would be that the EU accession induced an opposite, conservative reaction, as a backlash linked to a broader disagreement with the European Union directives.

Regardless of the channel, the result is a dissonance with the EU orientations and recommendations, which is laden with policy implications. This Czech idiosyncrasy in childrearing preferences signals that explicitly de-genderising proposals are likely to meet public opinion resistance, as we already witnessed with the promotion of nurseries for children under the age of 3 in 2009, and with the paternal leave debate in 2013.

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Appendix

Figure A Employment gap between women with and without pre-school children



Note: The employment gap represents the difference in employment rate between women with and without children under the age of 6.
Source: OECD 2010

Table A Czech family policy between 1948 and 2016

FAMILY POLICY INSTRUMENT		EFFECTS ON FERTILITY AND PARTICIPATION (expected)	
Maternity Leave and Benefits		Fertility	Participation
1948	Duration moves from 12 to 18 weeks	+	- SR + MR *
1964	22 weeks	+	- SR + MR
1968	26 weeks	+	- SR + MR
1987	28 weeks and 37 weeks if 2 dependent children or single mother	+ +	- SR + MR
Additional Maternity / Parental **Leave**			
1964	Creation of 1 year Additional Maternity	+	- SR + MR
1970	2 years	+	-
1989	3 years	+	-
2001	Additional Maternity leave becomes Parental Leave, accessible to fathers in the same conditions	+	+
Additional Maternity / Parental **Benefit**			
1970	Creation of the AM benefit, 1 year if 2 dependent children or single mother	+ +	
1971	2 years (same conditions)	+ +	
1987	3 years if child born after December 1987 (same conditions)	+ +	
1990	AM benefit becomes Parental benefit, 3 years for all children (7 for handicapped)		-
1995	Extension of the parental benefit: 4 years	+	- -
1998	No more limitation of worked hours for recipients	+	+
2001	The limitation of income for recipients moves from vital minimum to 50% above it		+
2004	No more limitation of income for recipients		+
2006	Less strict limitation of hours spent in childcare facility for recipients' child		+
2007	Significant increase of the parental benefit	+ +	-
2008	Creation of a Multi-Speed Parental benefit: 2, 3 or 4 years	+ +	+
2012	No more limitation of hours spent in childcare facility for recipients' child	+	+
2012	2008 Benefit setting modification: more flexible monthly amount	+	+
Child benefit			
1959	Means-tested Family benefit becomes Child benefit	+	
1968	Universal Child benefit	+ +	
1995	Again Means-tested Child benefit		
2008	No more vital minimum indexation		
Other family policy instruments			
1957	Abortion legalization (abortion commities)	-	+ +
1970's	Various measures: Lower retirement age for mothers, Housing allocations, advantageous loans, tax deductions, subsidization of childcare and related expenses (meals, textbooks)	+ +	
1995	Modification of the legal status of nurseries, steep decline	-	-
2012	Revocation of the public nursery status by the Ministry of Health	-	-
2013	Children Group Act: tax benefits for alternative childcare facilities	+	+
2016	7-day paid paternal leave bill voted	+	+

* In the **short run**, the extension of the leaves automatically decreases mothers' participation, but in the medium run the aspect of job security rather increases participation after the leave.

Key

Post-transitional policies: from 1989 onwards

EU harmonization (preparations and EU accession): from 2000 onwards

Table B European values study, descriptive statistics

	Czech Republic		Visegrad (SK, PL, HU)	
	1999	2008	1999	2008
Gender (ref. female)	0.52	0.55	0.53	0.56
Age	47.6	48.3	45.9	47.6
Family structure				
Married	0.61	0.47	0.63	0.55
1 child	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.17
2 children	0.44	0.4	0.37	0.35
3 children and more	0.19	0.16	0.25	0.22
Education				
Primary	0.19	0.14	0.24	0.2
Secondary	0.68	0.74	0.65	0.79
Tertiary	0.14	0.12	0.11	0.15
Labour market				
Active	0.54	0.53	0.52	0.5
Unemployed	0.04	0.04	0.09	0.07
Students	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.06
Obs	1908	1821	3426	4532

Source: EVS 1999 and 2008

Table C Generations and Gender programme, descriptive statistics Czech Rep.

	2005 panel	2008	2005 entire	2005 lost in attrition
	Mean/Proportion			(*sign. diff.)
Gender (ref. female)	0.53	0.53	0.52	0.51
Age	45.74	49.32	44.8	44.31*
Family structure				
Couple	65.5	62.93	63.2	62.16
Married	51.41	53.41	47.7	46.00
1 child	0.19	0.21	0.2	0.2
2 children	0.38	0.39	0.33	0.31*
3 children and more	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.11
Education				
Primary	0.2	0.12	0.23	0.24*
Secondary	0.65	0.72	0.63	0.62*
Tertiary	0.14	0.16	0.13	0.12*
Labour market				
Active	0.56	0.59	0.56	0.57
Unemployed	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.06
Students	0.07	0.04	0.09	0.1
Report financial difficulties	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25
Family (0)/ Welfare (1) preferences				
Childcare	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.26
Afterschool care	0.32	0.35	0.31	0.31
Elderly care	0.4	0.46	0.41	0.42
Cash for Elderly in need	0.72	0.67	0.71	0.7*
Cash for Young in need	0.76	0.7	0.74	0.73*
Couple Values (0=specialized, 1=undifferentiated)				
Daughters should care more	0.57	0.54	0.56	0.55
Women shouldn't earn more	0.57	0.52	0.55	0.54*
After divorce, child w/ mother	0.4	0.39	0.4	0.4
If scarce, jobs to men	0.57	0.55	0.56	0.56
Obs	3151	3151	10006	6855

Source: GGP 2005-2008

Table D Family/welfare preferences and income in 2005, OLS estimates

VARIABLES	(1) Childcare1	(2) Childcare2	(3) Elderly care	(4) Elderly cash	(5) Youth cash
Wealth	**0.000132 NS**	**-0.00173 NS**	**-0.0165*** **	**-0.0199*** **	**-0.0106** **
	(0.00451)	(0.00482)	(0.00469)	(0.00430)	(0.00415)
No children			*Reference Value*		
1 child	-0.0520***	-0.0604***	-0.0236	-0.00911	0.00382
	(0.0166)	(0.0167)	(0.0161)	(0.0151)	(0.0150)
2 children	-0.0873***	-0.0892***	-0.0527***	-0.00521	0.0122
	(0.0158)	(0.0159)	(0.0153)	(0.0141)	(0.0134)
3 and more	-0.0803***	-0.0688***	-0.0407**	0.00957	0.0322*
	(0.0200)	(0.0201)	(0.0196)	(0.0174)	(0.0165)
Male	0.00504	-0.00696	0.0189*	0.0121	-0.000911
	(0.0102)	(0.0104)	(0.0102)	(0.00954)	(0.00912)
Primary Educ			*Reference value*		
Secondary Educ	-0.00691	0.0175	0.0201	-0.00169	-0.0167
	(0.0132)	(0.0134)	(0.0135)	(0.0124)	(0.0115)
Tertiary Educ	-0.0118	0.0244	0.0123	-0.00848	-0.0431***
	(0.0165)	(0.0173)	(0.0167)	(0.0163)	(0.0158)
Married	0.0445***	0.0198*	0.0225**	0.00156	-0.00331
	(0.0113)	(0.0117)	(0.0114)	(0.0110)	(0.0103)
Age: 41-50			*Reference value*		
Age: 21-30	-0.0344**	-0.00929	-0.0544***	0.0157	0.0104
	(0.0163)	(0.0165)	(0.0160)	(0.0149)	(0.0142)
Age: 31-40	0.00498	0.00765	-0.0292*	-0.0112	-0.0116
	(0.0150)	(0.0151)	(0.0149)	(0.0145)	(0.0133)
Age: 51-60	-4.77e-05	0.0207	-0.0260*	-0.0115	-0.0304**
	(0.0146)	(0.0145)	(0.0146)	(0.0140)	(0.0133)
Age: 61-70	-0.0183	-0.0147	-0.0168	0.00553	-0.0140
	(0.0153)	(0.0156)	(0.0157)	(0.0146)	(0.0140)
Constant	0.290***	0.350***	0.466***	0.780***	0.813***
	(0.0217)	(0.0217)	(0.0208)	(0.0188)	(0.0181)
Observations	3,041	3,031	3,039	3,043	3,043
R-squared	0.016	0.015	0.013	0.010	0.010

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: GGP 2005
Note: The outcome variables are preferences for family/welfare for different social needs, ranged from *mainly family* (coded 0) to *mainly society* (coded 1).

Table E Family/welfare preferences and income in 2005, Ordered probit estimates

VARIABLES	(1) Childcare1	(2) Childcare2	(3) Elderly care	(4) Elderly cash	(5) Youth cash
Wealth	**-0.000827**	**-0.00425**	**-0.0641*** **	**-0.0851*** **	**-0.0537*** **
	(0.0183)	(0.0178)	(0.0176)	(0.0179)	(0.0182)
No children			*Reference value*		
1 child	-0.194***	-0.227***	-0.0886	-0.0331	0.0345
	(0.0646)	(0.0632)	(0.0624)	(0.0634)	(0.0647)
2 children	-0.342***	-0.340***	-0.204***	-0.0172	0.0588
	(0.0609)	(0.0591)	(0.0584)	(0.0595)	(0.0603)
3 children	-0.321***	-0.264***	-0.161**	0.0504	0.159**
	(0.0758)	(0.0737)	(0.0727)	(0.0742)	(0.0756)
Male	0.0137	-0.0424	0.0716*	0.0524	-0.00451
	(0.0413)	(0.0403)	(0.0398)	(0.0405)	(0.0411)
Primary Educ			*Reference value*		
Secondary educ	-0.0326	0.0763	0.0840*	-0.00759	-0.0757
	(0.0522)	(0.0510)	(0.0503)	(0.0513)	(0.0524)
Tertiary Educ	-0.0146	0.124*	0.0640	-0.0462	-0.199***
	(0.0711)	(0.0695)	(0.0689)	(0.0699)	(0.0709)
Married	0.177***	0.0713	0.0921**	0.00563	-0.0187
	(0.0466)	(0.0452)	(0.0445)	(0.0453)	(0.0461)
Age: 41-50			*Reference value*		
Age: 21-30	-0.116*	-0.0329	-0.211***	0.0646	0.0519
	(0.0651)	(0.0634)	(0.0629)	(0.0643)	(0.0653)
Age: 31-40	0.0298	0.0269	-0.117**	-0.0444	-0.0483
	(0.0594)	(0.0582)	(0.0575)	(0.0586)	(0.0596)
Age: 51--60	0.00257	0.0833	-0.103*	-0.0474	-0.130**
	(0.0589)	(0.0572)	(0.0567)	(0.0576)	(0.0586)
Age: 6170	-0.0793	-0.0664	-0.0668	0.0155	-0.0604
	(0.0636)	(0.0619)	(0.0608)	(0.0617)	(0.0628)
Constant cut1	-0.333***	-0.664***	-1.159***	-2.167***	-2.317***
	(0.0829)	(0.0811)	(0.0813)	(0.0913)	(0.0961)
Constant cut2	0.377***	0.154*	-0.398***	-1.632***	-1.785***
	(0.0831)	(0.0808)	(0.0800)	(0.0851)	(0.0876)
Constant cut3	1.169***	1.063***	0.753***	-0.671***	-0.851***
	(0.0855)	(0.0826)	(0.0805)	(0.0814)	(0.0833)
Constant cut4	1.668***	1.555***	1.280***	0.180**	0.00775
	(0.0899)	(0.0861)	(0.0831)	(0.0809)	(0.0823)
Observations	3,041	3,031	3,039	3,043	3,043

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: GGP 2005
Note: The outcome variables are preferences for family/welfare for different social needs, ranged from *mainly family* (coded 0) to *mainly society* (coded 1).

Table F Family/welfare preferences and gender values, OLS estimates

VARIABLES	(1) Family vs. Welfare preference Women	(2) Family vs. Welfare preference Men
Gender liberal	-0.0258 NS	-0.0900***
	(0.0284)	(0.0304)
Primary Educ	*Reference value*	
Secondary Educ	-0.00317	0.00180
	(0.0110)	(0.0123)
Tertiary Educ	-0.0235*	-0.000210
	(0.0141)	(0.0151)
Married	0.0151*	0.0114
	(0.00868)	(0.0118)
No children	*Reference value*	
1 child	-0.0364***	-0.0158
	(0.0139)	(0.0153)
2 children	-0.0480***	-0.0428***
	(0.0132)	(0.0142)
3 and more	-0.0379**	-0.0141
	(0.0155)	(0.0188)
Age: 41-50	*Reference value*	
Age: 21-30	0.000753	-0.0233
	(0.0133)	(0.0144)
Age: 31-40	-0.0169	0.000353
	(0.0121)	(0.0151)
Age: 51-60	-0.0206*	-0.00642
	(0.0118)	(0.0133)
Age: 61-70	-0.00514	-0.0259*
	(0.0126)	(0.0145)
Constant	0.534***	0.556***
	(0.0214)	(0.0198)
Observations	1,611	1,415
R-squared	0.016	0.019

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: GGP 2005
Note: The Family/welfare indicator ranges from *mainly family* (coded 0) to *mainly society* (coded 1). The gender attitude indicator ranges from 0 (conservative) to 1 (liberal). A negative correlation is therefore interpreted as: gender liberal individuals have higher preference for family than conservative individuals.

Table G Gender values determinants, OLS

VARIABLES	(1) Gender values indicator	(2)
Male	-0.0108*	-0.0108*
	(0.00590)	(0.00608)
Age: 41-50	*Reference value*	
Age: 21-30	0.0494***	0.0499***
	(0.00946)	(0.00985)
Age: 31-40	0.0171*	0.0167*
	(0.00873)	(0.00883)
Age: 51-60	-0.00294	-0.00402
	(0.00834)	(0.00848)
Age:61-70	-0.0307***	-0.0317***
	(0.00906)	(0.00918)
Well-off		0.0271***
		(0.0100)
Married		0.00282
		(0.00669)
No children		*Ref. value*
1 child		-0.00318
		(0.00931)
2 children		0.00801
		(0.00906)
3 children		-0.00389
		(0.0111)
Constant	0.527***	0.521***
	(0.00620)	(0.00852)
Observations	3,114	3,114
R-squared	0.021	0.025

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The gender values indicator ranks from 0 (traditional, specialized) to 1 (liberal, undifferentiated). Compared to the age group 41-50, younger groups are more liberal, older are more traditional.

Table H Family values over time, fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES		**Family ties**: weak (0) to strong (1)		
			Men	Women
2008 vs 2005	-0.00459 NS	-0.00515 NS	-0.00919**	-0.00163 NS
	(0.00253)	(0.00268)	(0.00403)	(0.00360)
Well-off		-0.0170***	-0.00276	-0.0322***
		(0.00617)	(0.00888)	(0.00860)
Primary Educ			*Ref. value*	
Secondary Educ		0.00539	0.0110	0.00280
		(0.00826)	(0.0120)	(0.0114)
Tertiary Educ		0.0256*	0.0355*	0.0153
		(0.0148)	(0.0201)	(0.0220)
Married		0.00866	-0.0335	0.0376*
		(0.0171)	(0.0260)	(0.0228)
No children			*Ref. value*	
1 child		0.0130	0.0428***	-0.00802
		(0.00853)	(0.0127)	(0.0117)
2 children		0.0277***	0.0337**	0.0226*
		(0.00921)	(0.0133)	(0.0129)
3 children		0.0362***	0.0545***	0.0195
		(0.0119)	(0.0177)	(0.0160)
Age: 41-50			*Ref. value*	
Age: 21-30		-0.0117	-0.0175	-0.000855
		(0.00899)	(0.0123)	(0.0136)
Age: 31-40		-0.0185**	-0.0143	-0.0146
		(0.00843)	(0.0127)	(0.0115)
Age: 51-60		-0.0148**	-0.0142	-0.0142
		(0.00691)	(0.0109)	(0.00886)
Constant	0.459***	0.439***	0.443***	0.438***
	(0.00180)	(0.0117)	(0.0159)	(0.0177)
Observations	6,197	6,197	2,892	3,305
R-squared	0.001	0.012	0.018	0.020
Number of id	3,150	3,150	1,479	1,684

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: GGP 2005-2008
Note: Results obtained with a within estimator, controlled for time variant individual characteristics age, wealth, education, marital status and number of children.