

Séminaire de recherche
Économies du monde musulman II
Tous les premiers vendredis du mois

Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense
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Ouvert au public

Séance 1
Vendredi 07 octobre 2016

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**The Political Economy of Predation
Manhunting and the Economics of Escape**

Intervention en Français

Documents:

Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2016, *The Political Economy of Predation: Manhunting and the Economics of Escape*, New York, Cambridge University Press. For a presentation of this book on June 10, 2016 in the OECD's *New Approaches to Economic Challenges* (NAEC), see the following link:

<http://video.oecd.org/2143/or/NAEC-The-Political-Economy-of-Predation.html>

Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2016, "A positive theory of the predatory state", *Public choice*, DOI 10.1007/s11127-016-0354-3, online July 12.

Abstract: *While the distinction between public and private goods is essential in developing a normative theory of non-predatory states, the focus of this paper is on a positive theory of predatory states. Since the predatory relationship between the state and its subjects depends on the power of the state to grab or to appropriate coercively and the subject's ability to escape or hide, the boundaries of the state are decided by the nature of the assets that can be taken more or less easily. Accordingly, I will introduce a new distinction between captive and fugitive assets that positively captures the frontiers of a state space. The US railroading in the nineteenth century provides an illustration regarding the explanatory power of an asset-appropriating perspective of the state compared to a public goods approach.*

Keywords: Captive, Fugitive and Mixed assets, Coercive appropriation, Public goods, Predatory state, US railroading

Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2016, "Economics of Empire-Building: Predatory and Price Competitions" (with Antoine Pietri and Tarik Tazdait), *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14659946859954, online July 15.

Abstract: *In this paper, we build a theoretical framework consistent with historical evidence in which empire-building is explained by price and predatory competitions on the market for protection. We explore how the assets structure detained by the buyers of protection influences the nature of protection and in fine the size of empires. Our main contribution is to introduce a distinction between two types of rent, namely an 'absolute' and a 'differential' one. The first one corresponds to rents extracted by empires using threats and coercion. In contrast, the second stands for economic advantages conferred on subjects of an empire.*

Keywords: Absolute and differential protection rents, Assets redeployability, Exit power.

Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2016, "The role of identity and Authority from Anarchy to Order: Insights from Modelling the Trajectory of Dueling in Europe" (with Behrooz Hassani-Mahmooei), *Economic Modelling*, Vol. 55, 2016, pp. 57-72.

Abstract: *Economic literature usually assumes order in terms of a Weberian state with monopoly over the means of violence. In this paper, we study historical situations in which such an order is absent and violent conflict namely duel of honor is an institution. Anarchy or the absence of state rules in managing violence does not imply the absence of private rules and arrangements (such as codes of dueling). Our focus is on the possible ways that a Weberian order can emerge from anarchy. We endeavor to capture this transition by introducing a computational model in which a simulated agent represents a social individual who considers both economic and political factors and interacts with other individuals as well as institutions to make a decision. We then use the trajectory of dueling in England, France, and Germany to validate our approach. The paper demonstrates how a complex, aggregative historical process over three centuries may be consistently explained on the basis of rational choices among heterogeneous agents conditioned by their group identity and State authority.*

Keywords: Agent-based Computational Economics, Conflict theory, Duel of honor, Identity Economics, Orderly anarchy.

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