

1 Market Efficiency and Optimal Hedging Strategy for
2 the US Ethanol Market

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8 **Work in progress**

9 **Abstract**

10 In many parts of the world, the decarbonization of the energy sectors has
11 become a priority in order to meet international climate objectives and address
12 local pollution issues. Among these, the transportation sector always raises
13 particular attention. Indeed, ambitious global targets may not be reachable
14 without strong actions in the transportation sector and more generally in the
15 mobility's framework, even if it is well-known that abatement costs in trans-
16 port are high. Moreover, and because transport relies almost exclusively on
17 fossils fuels, thinking about futures leading to a more diversified and resilient
18 transport sector is a crucial issue. Biofuels and more particularly ethanol are
19 considered as possible options by policy makers to decarbonize this sector. In
20 this context the determinants of the ethanol market and the price formation
21 process appear fundamental to better understand the dynamics of ethanol use
22 and the possibilities for industrial players to protect themselves against price
23 volatility. The aim of this paper is thus to study the ethanol price relationships
24 in the US spot and futures markets. We analyze the direct and cross-hedging
25 strategies – with corn, gasoline and oil futures markets – using wide range of
26 linear and nonlinear specifications with an asymmetric multivariate Garch error
27 structure. Our main results are the ability (i) of ethanol futures price to be an
28 unbiased estimator of future spot price through the efficiency of the ethanol
29 market, (ii) of the futures price to explain the spot price dynamics during high
30 volatile periods as in 2008-2009 and 2013-2014 periods and (iii) of the ethanol
31 futures market to reduce price risks exposure for long and short hedgers with
32 the simplest strategy, i.e., the naive hedge ratio of one.

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35 ratio

36 1 Introduction

37

38 Ethanol is derived from various agricultural products (cassava, corn, hemp, sugar
39 beet or sugarcane) and has been increasingly added to gasoline blends for several rea-
40 sons: (i) it helps to reduce greenhouse gases emissions (GHG) in the transportation
41 sector, (ii) if produced with agricultural feedstock, ethanol can be seen as a renew-
42 able energy, and (iii) from a technical point of view, the use of ethanol helps to boost
43 octane numbers and leads to an improvement in thermal engine efficiency. All these
44 factors have contributed to the development of ethanol’s use worldwide despite some
45 critics. Indeed, biofuels production induces an additional demand for agricultural
46 commodities initially used for food, inducing a competition on the uses with the
47 food (and thus potentially a rise of the prices) leading to the well-known “*food versus*
48 *fuel*” debate.¹

49

50 Despite the increase of ethanol production and consumption in the US since 2005,
51 firms in the biofuel sector face thin profit margin in part due to the lack of risk hedg-
52 ing strategy to protect against energy market volatility (Cheng and Anderson, 2017).
53 This could be one cause of some bankruptcies in this sector (Awudu et al., 2016).
54 However, futures contracts on corn-based ethanol were launched on March 2005 on
55 the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).² This futures market should help firms to fix
56 spot price as the futures price can be an unbiased predictor of the future spot price
57 (Lai and Lai, 1991). However, this property exists only under efficient market hy-
58 pothesis.³ In addition, derivatives markets, as futures contracts, allow commercial
59 players to reduce their price risk exposure with various hedging strategies and dif-
60 ferent tools. These tools protect against adverse price movements in order to reduce
61 the risk of loss in the business. The optimal hedging strategy is to minimize the vari-
62 ance of the hedge portfolio containing spot and futures contracts (Ederington, 1979).
63 In view of links of ethanol market with corn, gasoline and oil markets, highlighted
64 for example by Chiou-Wei et al. (2019), these latter could be used to established a
65 cross-hedging strategy.⁴

66

67 In this context, price dynamics analysis of ethanol markets as well as the ability
68 of the futures market to provide a good predictor of the spot price – through the
69 market efficiency – and to hedge price risk are major challenges. Indeed, the un-

¹This debate deals with the role of biofuels development in the increase in agricultural commodity prices during the 2000’s, see, e.g., OECD (2008), Nazlioglu (2011) or Nazlioglu and Soytaş (2012).

²CME Group is the world’s leading and most diverse derivatives marketplace, made up of four markets, CME, CBOT, NYMEX, and COMEX. Each market offers a wide range of global benchmarks across major asset classes.

³An efficient market is characterized by prices that reflect all available information. The weak form of market efficiency considers only historical price or return series in the information set (Fama, 1970).

⁴Cross-hedging occurs when the asset underlying the contract is different than the asset whose price is being hedged (Hull, 2005).

70 derstanding of ethanol markets allows (i) firms to provide higher profit, (ii) ethanol
71 market to achieve RFS2 target and (iii) policy makers to anticipate future growth of
72 the US cellulosic biodiesel market. The literature focusing on the hedging of ethanol
73 is very scarce with only works of Franken and Parcell (2003), Dahlgran (2009) and
74 Spencer et al. (2018). That could explain the lack of hedging behavior of ethanol re-
75 finers. In addition, these studies only use first moment estimation to compute hedge
76 ratio while an abundant literature highlights the performance of second moment es-
77 timation to derive efficient hedge ratio (Kroner and Sultan, 1993; Garcia et al., 1995;
78 Kavussanos and Nomikos, 2000).

79

80 The contributions of this paper are thus fourfold. First, we study the long-term
81 relationship between ethanol spot prices and the prices of futures contracts on the
82 CBOT; allowing us to investigate the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis.
83 Spencer et al. (2018) highlight such a cointegration relationship but only with the
84 Engle and Granger (1987) specification and without providing results about long-
85 term coefficients. Coefficients are yet useful to analysis the long-term condition in
86 the spot market. Indeed, a long-term parameter between spot and futures prices
87 greater (resp. smaller) than unity highlights a persistent contango (resp. backwar-
88 dation) situation (Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo, 2010). Our second contribution
89 is to analyze ethanol spot and futures prices relationship in order to check the exis-
90 tence of financial drivers in the spot price evolution in addition to physical drivers as
91 agricultural and energy prices. Third, we extend the scarce literature about hedg-
92 ing strategy in ethanol market in two ways (i) using a wider range of econometric
93 tools than previous works and (ii) checking efficiency of more ethanol linked markets
94 in cross-hedging strategy than previously, i.e., gasoline, oil and corn. By this, we
95 extent previous works of Franken and Parcell (2003) – analyzing cross-hedging strat-
96 egy with gasoline markets –, Dahlgran (2009) – who compares this cross-hedging
97 strategy with direct hedging – and Spencer et al. (2018) focusing only on direct
98 hedging strategy. Fourth, we propose a methodological contribution proposing to
99 test benefits from the nonparametric cointegration procedure from Nielsen (2010) in
100 prices dynamics analysis and hedging strategy. Indeed, the cointegration approach
101 of Johansen (1988) could generate a bias in estimations due to hypothesis about the
102 short-term specification.⁵

103

104 Our results highlight the ability of ethanol futures price to be an unbiased esti-
105 mator of future spot price through the efficiency of the ethanol market and a one
106 to one parity between these two prices in the long-term. In addition, despite the
107 disconnection of these two markets during normal periods, futures price can help
108 to understand the spot price dynamics during high volatile periods. These volatile
109 periods are furthermore mainly concentrated in 2008-2009 and 2013-2014 periods.
110 Finally, the ethanol futures market is the best one to reduce price risks exposure for
111 long and short hedgers with the simplest strategy, i.e., the naive hedge ratio of one

⁵In particular, this procedure imposes the restriction of linearity in the short-run dynamics.

112 and the nonparametric cointegration from Nielsen (2010) does not provide signifi-
113 cant improvement in comparison with the framework from Johansen (1988) despite
114 a better explanatory power.

115

116 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reminds the US ethanol
117 market evolution while section 3 briefly reviews the literature on storable commodity
118 market efficiency and hedging strategies on energy markets with a particular focus
119 on ethanol markets as well as methodology. In section 4, we present data and the
120 econometric methodology. Section 5 presents empirical results. The main conclu-
121 sions are summarized in the final section.

122

123 2 Ethanol market overview

124

125 Ethanol policy is a story that has many chapters in the past 40 years in the USA.
126 Ethanol inclusion in the US gasoline blends began in 1908 when the Model-T Ford
127 could be customized to run on gasoline or alcohol. It was not until the late Seventies,
128 however, that the meaningful inclusion of ethanol came about. The first government
129 involvement for ethanol was the Energy Tax Act of 1978 (a tax exemption for adding
130 ethanol to the gasoline blend) in the wake of geopolitical concerns in the oil market
131 with the 2nd world oil shock. The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982
132 and the Tax Reform Act of 1984 gave an impetus for ethanol inclusion despite a
133 decrease of the tax exemption during the 1992-2000 period with the Omnibus Budget
134 Reconciliation Act of 1990. The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program, created
135 by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and extended by the Energy Independence and
136 Security Act of 2007, has led to a new expansion of the US ethanol market. Ethanol
137 production (resp. consumption) have since been multiplied by four between 2005
138 and 2017, increasing approximately from 3.9 (resp. 4) to 15.9 (resp. 14.5) billion
139 gallons.⁶

140

141 Since 2010 the US has become a net exporter in the ethanol market. Accord-
142 ing to the US Census Bureau, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of
143 Agriculture, the US exported 1.4 billion gallons of ethanol in 2017 (8.65% of total US
144 ethanol production) and imported 76.6 million gallons of fuel ethanol (less than 1% of
145 US ethanol consumption). Brazil (33% of US exports), Canada (24%), India (13%)
146 and Philippines (5%) are the top destinations of US ethanol in 2017. Brazil also re-
147 mains the only one supplier for the US in 2017. This export-import structure within
148 the ethanol market with Brazil can be easily explained by the RFS and California
149 Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) targets put in place for the reduction of GHG
150 emissions that impose more stringent requirements. Life cycle analysis (LCA) stud-
151 ies demonstrate that ethanol from sugarcane has a better scoring in terms of GHG

⁶These data come from US Energy Information Administration and include denaturant.

152 emissions than products based on corn feedstock.⁷ It contributes to the substitution
153 of corn-ethanol production from the countryside with imported sugarcane-ethanol
154 from Brazil.

155

156 Note that the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2) requires the increase in the US
157 biofuel consumption to 36 billion gallons in 2022 including a domestic production of
158 approximately 20 billion gallons of ethanol. Corn-based ethanol consumption will
159 be limited to 15 billion gallons corn-based ethanol uses. The requirement of approx-
160 imately 5 billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol is the main future development in the
161 US ethanol market. In addition, 11 billion gallons – ethanol equivalent – of cellulosic
162 diesel may be produced in the US leading to the emergence of a new US biofuel mar-
163 ket.⁸ The ethanol demand is thus partly driven by such public policies. However,
164 ethanol prices are driven by various other determinants. Indeed, US ethanol market
165 is inherently linked to agricultural – specifically corn – and other energy markets – in
166 particular gasoline and oil. Since the development of ethanol production in US, these
167 markets are interrelated with price links in long- and short-term as well as in term
168 of volatility (see for example Zhang et al. (2009), Serra et al. (2011) or Chiou-Wei
169 et al. (2019) and references therein). The ethanol market structure is thus driven
170 by (i) the inclusion policy of different countries, (ii) the regulatory framework, (iii)
171 energy prices and especially the evolution of the crude oil price, and (iv) the agricul-
172 tural feedstock prices. Ethanol prices registered several ups and downs since 2008,
173 with prices ranging from \$1.25 per gallon to \$4.12 per gallon following the volatility
174 observed in energy and agricultural prices.

175

176 With the development of the physical ethanol market, futures contracts on corn-
177 based ethanol were launched by the CBOT on floor-based trading in March 2005
178 and on the electronic platform in 2006.⁹ On the one hand, the volume reached 1,000
179 contracts for the first time in July 2006 and it really took off after 2009 increasing,
180 for the two months term contract, from around 78,864 in 2008 to 404,133 in 2016,
181 i.e., multiplied by a factor of 5 (Figure 1). We also observed a decrease in transaction
182 volumes between 2008 and 2016 as contract terms grew longer, and a virtual absence
183 of liquidity for long-term contracts (compared to short-term maturity). In fact, the
184 inadequate information available at any given moment t on contracts whose maturity
185 period is greater than ten months does not give traders the incentives to trade in the
186 market. Moreover the maturity greater than two months registered a sharp decline
187 in transaction volumes after 2012. On the other hand, the share of non-commercial
188 players increased from around 15% before 2008 to over 35% on average since 2014
189 (Figure 2). However, both the increase in the volume of transactions on financial
190 trading floors and the growing share of non-commercial players should be kept in per-
191 spective. During previous decades, and especially in the initial phase of construction

⁷See, for example, Edwards et al. (2014).

⁸40 CFR Part 80, 2010.

⁹For the sake of completeness, the CBOT introduced options contracts in 2007.

192 of the ethanol futures market, the main objective was to attract and concentrate the
 193 liquidity required for commercial traders to achieve hedging activities. Nevertheless,
 194 the rise in transaction volumes has been accompanied by a concentration of traders'
 195 liquidity on the shortest maturity contracts exchanged on commodity markets. This
 196 factor has been observed and studied, for example on the WTI market in the US
 197 (Hache and Lantz, 2013).¹⁰

198

Figure 1: Open interest by contracts maturity





Figure 2: Commercial positions



199

200 3 Literature review

201

¹⁰See also the literature review in Lautier (2005).

202 Following the works of Kaldor (1939), Working (1948), Brennan (1958) and Telser
 203 (1958), spot and futures prices of a storable commodity should be equal. The dif-
 204 ference between these prices is explained by the cost of storage and the interest rate
 205 as,

$$F_t^T = S_t \exp[(r_t + \bar{s})(T - t)] \quad (1)$$

206 and with a log-transformation,

$$f_t^T = s_t + (r_t + \bar{s})(T - t) \quad (2)$$

207 Here, F_t^T (resp. f_t^T) is the price (resp. log-price) of futures contract at the time t
 208 for a maturity T . S_t (resp. s_t) is the spot price (resp. log-price) at the same date.
 209 r_t and \bar{s} refer to the risk-free interest rate and the cost of carry, respectively. This
 210 latter is supposed to be constant. According to the aforementioned works, the differ-
 211 ence between spot and futures prices is instantaneously compensated by arbitrageurs.

212
 213 This hypothesis has been relaxed by Garbade and Silber (1983). They mention
 214 that arbitrageurs operate in the markets if the spread between these prices is large
 215 enough to enlarge their profits according to the transaction and information costs.
 216 Therefore, the unit relationship between spot and futures prices is only valid in the
 217 long-term. The spot and futures markets are thus efficient if prices are cointegrated
 218 as in Chowdhury (1991) or Lai and Lai (1991). In addition, Garbade and Silber
 219 (1983) show that futures markets integrate new information faster than in the un-
 220 derlying spot market, leading to a causality from futures to spot prices. It helps the
 221 price discovery process registered in commodities markets which leads to informa-
 222 tional efficiency for physical and financial markets.

223
 224 Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) extent this model by integrating the con-
 225 venience yield, i.e., the premium attributed by agents for physically holding the
 226 commodity instead of holding a futures contract. It depends on various market char-
 227 acteristics in the spot market (weather conditions, geopolitical unrest, transaction
 228 costs, etc.).¹¹ With a constant free-risk interest rate, one-period futures contract
 229 and the approximation of the convenience yield, y_t , used by these authors, as

$$y_t = \gamma_1 s_t - \gamma_2 f_t \quad (3)$$

230 equation (2) becomes

$$f_t = \frac{1 - \gamma_1}{1 - \gamma_2} s_t + \frac{\bar{r} + \bar{s}}{1 - \gamma_2} \quad (4)$$

231

232

233 Their theoretical framework allows a long-term relationship, i.e., a cointegrating
 234 relationship, with a non-unit coefficient between spot and futures prices. In addition,
 235 they mention that the coefficient value depends on the spot market condition. The

¹¹See Routledge et al. (2000) or Heaney (2002) for more details on the convenience yield.

236 parameter is greater (resp. smaller) than unity if the spot market is in contango
237 (resp. backwardation).

238

239 Literature about the estimation of an optimal hedge ratio has been developed
240 since the seminal work of Ederington (1979) who proposes to use the estimated co-
241 efficient between changes in spot and futures prices with an ordinary least square
242 estimator (OLS). However, this hedge ratio is unsatisfactory for many markets (Cec-
243 chetti et al., 1988; Myers and Thompson, 1989). Baillie and Myers (1991) and
244 Kroner and Sultan (1993) state that the hedge ratio should be time-varying based
245 on the time-varying distribution of many asset prices. They propose computing this
246 dynamic optimal hedge ratio (δ_t) for each period by taking into account all past
247 information (Ω_{t-1}) such as

$$\delta_t|\Omega_{t-1} = \frac{\sigma_{t-1}(\Delta F_{t-1}, \Delta S_{t-1})}{\sigma_{t-1}^2(\Delta F_{t-1})} \quad (5)$$

248

249

250 Many studies estimate those conditional covariance (σ_{t-1}) and variance (σ_{t-1}^2)
251 with the multivariate Garch model proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995) as, for in-
252 stance, Kroner and Sultan (1993), Garcia et al. (1995) or Kavussanos and Nomikos
253 (2000) and conclude there has been an improvement of the hedging strategy with
254 the dynamic hedge ratio compared to the constant formulation. The improvement
255 degree depends on the market and the futures maturity studied (Lien and Tse, 2002).

256

257 The estimation of the dynamic hedge ratio should integrate the possible existence
258 of a cointegrating relationship between spot and futures prices. Kroner and Sultan
259 (1993), Ghosh (1993), Chou et al. (1996) or Lien (1996) highlighted an underesti-
260 mated hedge ratio if this characteristic is not accounted for. In addition, Brooks et al.
261 (2002) show the improvements of the hedge ratio effectiveness with the integration
262 of the asymmetric volatility response against positive and negative shocks, i.e., the
263 leverage effect. Furthermore, the conditional mean (Sarno and Valente, 2000) and
264 variance (Lamoureux and Lastrapes, 1990) estimations can be biased if regime shifts
265 exist. Thus, the hedge ratio effectiveness can be improved by integrating regime
266 shifts in the estimation. Lee and Yoder (2007a,b) include regime shifts in the vari-
267 ance process and show an improvement – but not always significant – of the hedge
268 ratio effectiveness. Alizadeh et al. (2008) extent this model by integrating regime
269 shifts in variance and conditional mean processes and highlight a significant effec-
270 tiveness improvement for most of the markets studied. Finally, Salvador and Arago
271 (2014) propose to incorporate (i) the regime shifts, the cointegrating relationship
272 and the leverage effect in the same model in order to estimate an optimal dynamic
273 hedge ratio, as well as (ii) the short-run dynamics between spot and futures price
274 changes.

275

276 The literature concerning hedging strategies on energy markets is well developed
277 with, for instance, Lien and Yang (2008) for heating and crude oil markets, Al-
278 izadeh et al. (2008) on crude oil, unleaded gasoline and heating oil markets, Hanly
279 (2017) with WTI and Brent crude oils, natural gas, unleaded gasoline, heating oil
280 and gasoil. These various works highlight the performance of various sophisticated
281 econometric models¹² in hedging strategy for majority of energy markets. However,
282 the literature on hedging strategies on US ethanol market is very scarce. Franken
283 and Parcell (2003) highlight the cross-hedging efficiency between ethanol spot price
284 and unleaded gasoline futures markets, that is to say a price risk reduction com-
285 pare to the situation without hedging behaviors. However, while they correct the
286 estimation for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, they use the estimated coef-
287 ficient between spot and futures price changes to compute hedge ratio and do not
288 incorporate the error correction term, regime switching and time-varying variance
289 process. Dahlgran (2009) compares direct hedging for ethanol commercial agents
290 with cross-hedging strategy with unleaded and Reformulated Gasoline Blendstock
291 for Oxygen Blending (RBOB gasoline) futures markets. He demonstrates that the
292 direct hedging strategy outperforms cross-hedging for a four-week, and more, hedge
293 horizon. However, he does not improve econometric tool to derive hedge ratio. Fi-
294 nally, Spencer et al. (2018) analyze direct hedging strategy using various econometric
295 tools. They compare the classic OLS based hedge ratio with those provided by VAR
296 and VECM estimation. They highlight the lack of hedging improvement with these
297 two last econometric models.

298

299 4 Data and methods

300

301 As stressed above, our article deals with the relationship between the spot prices
302 and the futures prices of ethanol. As transaction volumes have risen, in particular
303 for the shortest maturities, we focus on the relationship between the spot prices and
304 the prices for the two-month futures contracts. The continuous futures prices series
305 is thus the Wednesday¹³ closing prices of the second nearest contract.¹⁴ The data
306 studied are relative to the ethanol in the North American market: the spot price for
307 ethanol (Argus Ethanol USGC barge/rail fob Houston)¹⁵ and the futures prices of
308 ethanol on the CBOT. The data cover the period from January 2008 to March 2018,
309 corresponding to 534 weekly observations. The in-sample analysis is done for the

¹²In particular, these works use Markov-switching, asymmetric multivariate Garch and dynamic conditional correlation Garch specifications concerning the variance estimation.

¹³We use Tuesday when Wednesday is not a business day.

¹⁴The contract with the closest maturity is not liquid. In addition, we do not roll over to the front month contract to deal with thin trading and expiration effects, as Alizadeh et al. (2008), due to the low liquidity in maturity higher to 2 months.

¹⁵This price has the advantage to be located at an equal distance to most biorefineries (<https://ethanolrfa.org/resources/biorefinery-locations/>)

310 period from January 2008 to December 2016, 456 observations, and data for January
 311 2017 to March 2018 are used for the out-of-sample analysis, corresponding to 78 ob-
 312 servations. The prices are expressed in US dollars per gallon and are log-transformed.
 313

314 Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics and tests results. Unit root tests
 315 confirm the stationarity of spot and futures prices series in their first-difference.¹⁶ In
 316 addition, the Ljung and Box (1978) and ARCH tests confirm the presence of auto-
 317 correlation in most cases and heteroscedasticity, respectively. These characteristics
 318 justify the choice of a specification with autoregressive terms and heteroscedastic
 319 errors.

320

Table 1: Summary statistics and unit root tests

Variables	Level		Log-return	
	Spot	Futures	Spot	Futures
Mean	\$2.09	\$1.92	0.000	0.000
Std. errors	0.468	0.413	0.050	0.040
Skewness	0.263	0.290	0.073	-0.281
Kurtosis	2.329	1.767	6.096	4.297
ADF	0.047*	0.316	0.001*	0.001*
PP	0.093*	0.333	0.001*	0.001*
KPSS	0.001	0.001	>0.100*	>0.100*
Perron	-1.134	-1.189	/	/
	-3.8	-3.8	/	/
Q(6)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.889
Q ² (6)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001

Note: This table reports descriptive statistics and the p-value of the unit root tests applied, i.e., Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1981) (ADF), Phillips and Perron (1988) (PP) and Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS). The star mentions the stationarity of the variable. The Perron's lines refer to the test from Perron (1990) with the test's statistic and the critical value at a 5% significance level in the first and second line, respectively. The critical value comes from Perron and Vogelsang (1992). The null hypothesis of unit root with break is rejected if the test statistic, in absolute value, is greater than the critical value. Q(6) and Q²(6) are the p-value of the test from Ljung and Box (1978) and ARCH test (Engle, 1982) for 6th order autocorrelation, respectively.

321 We apply the test from Johansen (1988) to check the existence of a long-term
 322 relationship with unit cointegrating vectors and to estimate the conditional mean
 323 with a Markov switching vector error correction model (Ms-VECM) within a bivari-
 324 ate framework. The inclusion of a multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional
 325 heteroscedasticity (MGarch) error structure allows us to compute the dynamic hedge
 326 ratio. By including a long-term equilibrium, we eliminate the bias in the hedge ratio
 327 estimation mentioned by Kroner and Sultan (1993) and Ghosh (1993). In addition,
 328 the nonlinear specification avoids estimation bias due to the existence of multiple
 329 regimes in the mean (Sarno and Valente, 2000) and variance (Lamoureux and Las-

¹⁶In view of the conflicting results for the spot log-price series, we apply the unit root test from Perron (1990) which confirms its non-stationarity with a break in mean on March 12 2014. We choose this test in view of series characteristics, i.e., the absence of trend and a potential break in the mean. We present results with innovational-outlier model for break date determination. Results with additional-outlier model are similar.

330 trapes, 1990) equations. Furthermore, the dynamic hedge ratio computed with this
 331 specification outperforms OLS hedge ratio in many energy markets (Alizadeh et al.,
 332 2008). Finally, we take into account the leverage effect within the Gjr framework.

333

334 It should be emphasized that the cointegration test of Johansen (1988) requires
 335 assumptions regarding the short-run dynamics that must follow a linear process. Us-
 336 ing this procedure with a non-linear short-run specification may lead to bias in both
 337 cointegration test results and long-term estimations, generating in turn a bias on
 338 the short-run and conditional variance estimations. To overcome these major draw-
 339 backs, we rely on nonparametric variance ratio testing approach from Nielsen (2010)
 340 as this methodology does not require assumptions in the short-run specification.¹⁷
 341 The nonparametric variance ratio trace statistic is defined by

$$\Lambda_{n,r}(d_1) = T^{2d_1} \sum_{j=1}^{n-r} \lambda_j \quad (6)$$

342 where λ_j , $j = 1, \dots, n$, are the eigenvalues, listed by increasing order, of the observed
 343 $(n \times T)$ time series matrix, r is the cointegration rank tested and d_1 is a summation
 344 parameter fixed to 0.1.¹⁸ The eigenvalues of the price series matrix are given by the
 345 solutions of

$$|\lambda B_T - A_T| = 0 \quad (7)$$

346 with

$$\begin{aligned} A_T &= \sum_{t=1}^T Z_t Z_t' \\ B_T &= \sum_{t=1}^T \tilde{Z}_t \tilde{Z}_t' \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

347 where \tilde{Z}_t is the fractional difference of Z_t truncated by d_1 . Z_t is our time series
 348 matrix after demeaning. The null hypothesis is the presence of $r - 1$ cointegration
 349 relationships. A test statistic that is greater than the critical value leads to the
 350 rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative, i.e., the existence of r
 351 cointegration relationships. In addition, the estimated cointegration coefficients are
 352 provided by the eigenvectors associated with eigenvalues and converge to their real
 353 values. Therefore, by using both cointegration approach from Johansen (1988) and
 354 Nielsen (2010), we can analyze the effect of the long-term estimation bias on the
 355 hedge ratio efficiency.

356

¹⁷For more details on the testing procedure, see Nielsen (2010).

¹⁸As mentioned by Nielsen (2010), the choice of $d_1 = 0.1$ maximizes the power of the test.

357 The Ms-VECM with Gjr-MGarch¹⁹ error structure can be expressed by

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta X_t &= c + \Gamma_{st} \Delta X_{t-1} + \Pi_{st} X_{t-1} + \epsilon_{t,st} \\ \epsilon_{t,st} &= \begin{pmatrix} \epsilon_{s,t,st} \\ \epsilon_{f,t,st} \end{pmatrix} | \Omega_{t-1} \sim IN(0, H_{t,st}) \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

358 where $\Delta X_t = (\Delta s_t, \Delta f_t)'$ (resp. $X_{t-1} = (s_{t-1}, f_{t-1})'$) is the vector of log-returns
 359 (resp. log-price) and c is a vector of constant. Γ_{st} and Π_{st} are coefficient matrices
 360 related to short- and long-term dynamics, respectively.²⁰ These (2×2) matrices
 361 depend on the regime st , $st = 1, 2$. $\epsilon_{t,st}$ is a regime-dependent Gaussian white noise
 362 vector. With our multivariate Garch error structure, the error covariance matrix,
 363 $H_{t,st}$, is time- and regime-dependent.

364

365 As mentioned by Alizadeh et al. (2008), two steps are necessary to estimate
 366 this model. First, we apply the cointegration procedures from Johansen (1988) and
 367 Nielsen (2010) to obtain the long-term parameters, β , includes in the matrix $\Pi = \alpha\beta'$.
 368 The vector α contains parameters characterizing the adjustment process to the long-
 369 term equilibrium and will be estimated in the second step.

370

371 Second, we introduce regime shifts depending on an unobserved state variable st .
 372 The latter can takes two values, $st = 1, 2$, corresponding to two different regimes.
 373 This variable follows a first order Markov process with the transition probability
 374 matrix,

$$P = \begin{pmatrix} Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 1\} & Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 1\} \\ Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 2\} & Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 2\} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 - Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 2\} & Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 1\} \\ Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 2\} & 1 - Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 1\} \end{pmatrix} \quad (10)$$

375 where $Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 2\}$ (resp. $Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 1\}$) is the probability that the system will shift
 376 from state 1 (resp. 2) to state 2 (resp. 1). $Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 1\}$ (resp. $Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 2\}$) is the
 377 probability that the system will stay in regime 1 (resp. regime 2). We obviously have
 378 $Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 1\} + Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 2\} = 1$ and $Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 1\} + Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 2\} = 1$. All the coefficients
 379 depend on the regime st except for the long-term coefficients, β . In the presence of
 380 a cointegrating relationship, the Π_{st} matrix is thus decomposed as $\Pi_{st} = \alpha_{st}\beta'$.

381

382 The conditional covariance matrix of error terms, $H_{t,st}$, is regime-dependent,
 383 time-varying, and follows a multivariate Garch specification with a Baba et al. (1987)
 384 framework, i.e., BEKK, as

$$H_{t,st} = C'_{st} C_{st} + A'_{st} \epsilon_{t-1} \epsilon'_{t-1} A_{st} + B'_{st} H_{t-1} B_{st} + D'_{st} \eta_{t-1} \eta'_{t-1} D_{st} \quad (11)$$

385 with ϵ_{t-1} and H_{t-1} being the vector of mean equation residuals and the global co-
 386 variance matrix for the past period, respectively. η_{t-1} is negative past shocks, i.e.,

¹⁹We estimate a wide range of specifications but only detail the more complex model.

²⁰We integrate only one lag in the short-run dynamics according to the information criterion BIC from Schwarz (1978) during the Johansen cointegration procedure.

387 $\eta_{t-1} = \min(\epsilon_{t-1}, 0)$. C_{st} is a (2×2) lower triangular matrix containing regime-
388 dependent coefficients. A_{st} , B_{st} and D_{st} are (2×2) diagonal matrices of coefficients
389 measuring the past shock effects on the conditional covariance matrix, their per-
390 sistence and the additional effect of a past negative shock, respectively. However,
391 the conditional covariance matrix depends on the sequence of all previous regimes
392 through H_{t-1} . With this path-dependence problem, the estimation by the maximum
393 likelihood method is numerically infeasible. To overcome this problem, we follow the
394 formulations of Gray (1996) and Lee and Yoder (2007b) concerning the conditional
395 variances, h_{ss} and h_{ff} , and the conditional covariance, h_{sf} , respectively, as

$$h_{ss,t} = \pi_{1,t}(r_{s,1,t}^2 + h_{ss,1,t}) + (1 - \pi_{1,t})(r_{s,2,t}^2 + h_{ss,2,t}) - [\pi_{1,t}r_{s,1,t} + (1 - \pi_{1,t})r_{s,2,t}]^2 \quad (12)$$

$$h_{ff,t} = \pi_{1,t}(r_{f,1,t}^2 + h_{ff,1,t}) + (1 - \pi_{1,t})(r_{f,2,t}^2 + h_{ff,2,t}) - [\pi_{1,t}r_{f,1,t} + (1 - \pi_{1,t})r_{f,2,t}]^2 \quad (13)$$

397

$$h_{sf,t} = \pi_{1,t}(r_{s,1,t}r_{f,1,t} + h_{sf,1,t}) + (1 - \pi_{1,t})(r_{s,2,t}r_{f,2,t} + h_{sf,2,t}) - [\pi_{1,t}r_{s,1,t} + (1 - \pi_{1,t})r_{s,2,t}][\pi_{1,t}r_{f,1,t} + (1 - \pi_{1,t})r_{f,2,t}] \quad (14)$$

398 In equations (12), (13) and (14), $\pi_{st,t}$ is the probability of being in the state st at the
399 time t . $h_{ss,st,t}$ (resp. $h_{ff,st,t}$) is the regime-dependent variance concerning the spot
400 (resp. futures) price at the time t and is contained in $H_{t,st}$. Similarly, $h_{sf,st,t}$ is the
401 state-dependent covariance at the time t and is an element of the same matrix. $r_{s,st,t}$
402 (resp. $r_{f,st,t}$) is the regime-dependent conditional mean of the spot (resp. futures)
403 price equation at the time t . These latter are calculated from the following equations:

$$\epsilon_{s,t} = \Delta s_t - [\pi_{1,t}r_{s,1,t} + (1 - \pi_{1,t})r_{s,2,t}] \quad (15)$$

404

$$\epsilon_{f,t} = \Delta f_t - [\pi_{1,t}r_{f,1,t} + (1 - \pi_{1,t})r_{f,2,t}] \quad (16)$$

405

406

407 This Ms-VEC model is estimated by maximizing of the likelihood function. Each
408 state-dependent error follows a N-dimensional normal distribution with zero mean
409 and $H_{t,st}$ covariance matrix. The global density function is a mixture of these dis-
410 tributions weighted by the probability of being in each regime:

$$f(X_t, \theta) = \frac{\pi_{1,t}}{2\pi} |H_{t,1}|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2} \epsilon'_{t,1} H_{t,1}^{-1} \epsilon_{t,1}\right) + \frac{\pi_{2,t}}{2\pi} |H_{t,2}|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2} \epsilon'_{t,2} H_{t,2}^{-1} \epsilon_{t,2}\right) \quad (17)$$

411

$$L(\theta) = \sum_{t=1}^T \log f(X_t, \theta) \quad (18)$$

412 with θ denoting the parameter vector. The log-likelihood function (equation (18))
413 is maximized using the expectation-maximisation algorithm proposed by Dempser

414 et al. (1977) under constraints like $\pi_{1,t} + \pi_{2,t} = 1$; $\pi_{1,t}, \pi_{2,t} \geq 0$.

415

416 With our specification, we can compute the dynamic hedge ratio as

$$\delta_t | \Omega_{t-1} = \frac{h_{sf,t}}{h_{ff,t}} \quad (19)$$

417 where $h_{sf,t}$ et $h_{ff,t}$ are forecasted for the out-of-sample analysis.

418

419 In order to analyze the hedging strategies' performance of each specification²¹ we
420 compute hedged portfolios each week and their returns variance over the sample as

$$Var(\Delta s_t - \delta_t \Delta f_t) \quad (20)$$

421 However, the variance of the hedged portfolio provide an incomplete risk measure in
422 our case. Indeed, ethanol refiners are short hedgers concerned by minimizing loss in
423 the basis $\Delta s_t - \delta_t \Delta f_t$, hereafter y_t . The semi-variance negative (*SVar.-*) is therefore
424 the adequate measure of risk for ethanol refiners as they provide information in the
425 loss risk:

$$SVar.- = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T (\min(0, y_t))^2 \quad (21)$$

426 with y_t , the hedged portfolio return. We also provide the semi-variance positive
427 (*SVar.+*) for long hedgers purpose, i.e., the ethanol blenders.

428

429 Another way to consider this benefit is the value-at-risk (VaR) at the probability
430 p exposure providing the loss, L , for which a higher loss, l , has a probability p to
431 occur. We calculate the VaR, for a probability 5%, using the empirical distribution
432 of the hedge portfolio returns, as:

$$VaR_{5\%} = \inf\{L \in \mathcal{R} : Pr(l > L) \leq 5\%\} \quad (22)$$

433 We also provide the Expected Shortfall (ES) which is a better measure of the risk in
434 the hedged portfolio return. Indeed, the VaR gives only the minimal lost in the 5%
435 of extreme negative case. The ES allows us to have the mean lost of these extreme
436 events :

$$ES_{5\%} = E(y_t | y_t \leq VaR_{5\%}) \quad (23)$$

437 with y_t , the hedged portfolio return.

438

²¹We estimate 22 specifications including 8 linear and 14 nonlinear models. Specifications vary about inclusion, or not, of error correction and autoregressive terms in mean equation, asymmetry in variance equation, as well as parameters allowed to switch. In addition, we use an OLS model and a naive model, i.e., with a unit hedging ratio.

439 **5 Empirical results**

440

441 Recall that we first want to check the efficient market hypothesis. We second
 442 analyze the price dynamics between the US spot and futures ethanol markets before
 443 to third examine the volatility behaviors. We fourth compute a wide range of direct
 444 hedge ratio to provide best hedging strategy and compare its performance to cross-
 445 hedging strategy using gasoline, corn and oil.

446

Table 2: Cointegration tests

$$\beta_s s_t + f_t + \beta_0 = u_t$$

	Johansen (1988)	Nielsen (2010)
Cointegration Test	31.50 (25.86)	3.779 (3.710)
β_0	0.111 (0.001)	- (-)
β_f	1 (-)	1 (-)
β_s	-1.047 (0.070)	-1.0123 (-)

Note: Cointegration test lines provide the test statistic and critical values at a 1% significance level in brackets. A test statistic greater than the critical value leads to the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating relationship. The chosen specification is with constant and without trend. Parameters for the cointegration relationship are mentioned with the p-value, in brackets, from the LR test $\beta_0 = 0$ and $|\beta_s| = 1$. Note that constant is not provided with the procedure from Nielsen (2010).

447 First of all, Table 2 provides results given by cointegration tests from Johansen
 448 (1988)²² and Nielsen (2010). As expected, these two procedures reject the null
 449 hypothesis of no cointegration relationship. The US ethanol market can therefore
 450 be seen as an efficient market in the weak form of this hypothesis. This result is in
 451 line with Spencer et al. (2018) who use the cointegration framework from Engle and
 452 Granger (1987). We can then analyze the ability of models from Garbade and Silber
 453 (1983) and Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) to explain the ethanol market
 454 through the value of the long-term parameter β_s . As mentioned in the section 3,
 455 its unity – in absolute value – allows us to conclude to the lack of situation of
 456 contango or backwardation in the long-term. As reported for the LR ratio test
 457 from Johansen (1995), we cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit coefficient – in
 458 absolute term – for the long-term parameter associated to the spot price. The theory
 459 from Garbade and Silber (1983) is thus valid to explain the long-term relationship
 460 between these two ethanol markets, the physical market of ethanol does not exhibit
 461 contango or backwardation and the futures price of ethanol can therefore be seen as
 462 an unbiased predictor of the future price on the spot market (Lai and Lai, 1991) with

²²Note that the result presented here comes from the eigenvalue statistic. Result with the trace statistic is close and available upon request

463 an one-to-one parity. To finish up with the long-term prices analysis, the Table 3
 464 provides results from the long-term causality test from Toda and Yamamoto (1995).
 465 As expected, the hypothesis of no causality from spot to futures prices can not be
 466 rejected but the causal relationship from futures to spot prices can not be highlighted.
 467 This unexpected result contradicts the process of price discovery through the futures
 468 market and can be explained by (i) the existence of nonlinear long-term causality
 469 from futures to spot prices and/or (ii) a more complex causality system including
 470 corn, gasoline and oil markets. Indeed, Chiou-Wei et al. (2019) highlight a long-term
 471 relationship of ethanol price with corn, soybean and oil prices. The ethanol spot
 472 price could also be lead in the long-term by these agricultural and energy markets
 473 in addition to the futures price of ethanol.

Table 3: long-term causality tests

Spot \Rightarrow Futures	0.871
Futures \Rightarrow Spot	0.115

Note: The causality tests refer to the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) test whose null hypothesis is the absence of long-term causality. We provide p-value of the test.

474 Second, we analyze the short-term dynamics between spot and futures ethanol
 475 prices through the adjustments to equilibrium and effects of past price changes. We
 476 estimate the Ms-VEC model with two states applied to both the mean and the vari-
 477 ance equations. These two states refer to low ($st = 1$) and high ($st = 2$) volatility
 478 regimes. Table 4 presents results with the Nielsen’s cointegration specification.²³ Be-
 479 fore results interpretation, two points must be discussed. While futures standardized
 480 errors have good properties, our specification fails to capture all the heteroscedas-
 481 ticity in the ethanol spot prices. In addition, this complex specification has no
 482 asymptotic theory. We should thus interpret coefficients significance with caution.²⁴

483
 484 Concerning the behavior of the spot and futures prices during periods of long-
 485 term disequilibrium – presented in the second part of the Table 4 –, only futures
 486 prices coefficients ($\alpha_{f,st}$) are significant in the low and high volatility regimes. Infor-
 487 mation about this disequilibrium are thus incorporated faster in the futures market
 488 leading this price to move in order to restore the long-term equilibrium. However,
 489 the ethanol market seems to be quite different compared to other energy markets.
 490 Indeed, spot prices in energy markets seem to restore faster long-term equilibrium
 491 than the futures prices as highlighted by Alizadeh et al. (2008) for the oil, gasoline
 492 and heating oil markets. The ethanol spot market is thus less reactive to new infor-
 493 mation than other energy market, probably due to the price-setting mechanism used
 494 as for example contractual agreements. This lack of responsiveness in the ethanol

²³Table 4 presents results for the best model in term of explanatory power. Results concerning the 22 specifications are available upon request.

²⁴P-values are thus computed numerically from the second derivatives matrix of the log likelihood allowing us to approximate the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of parameters (as in Hamilton (1994)).

495 spot market is also found by Chiou-Wei et al. (2019) concerning long-term equilib-
496 rium with oil, corn and soybean prices. Note that the adjustment process is faster
497 during the low volatility ($st = 1$) compared to high volatility ($st = 2$) periods high-
498 lighting a link between short-term prices dynamics and volatility regimes.
499

Table 4: Estimation results

		Ms-VECM ^N -Gjr-MGarch			
long-term equation					
	β_s	-1.012	(-)		
	β_f	1	(-)		
	β_0	-	(-)		
Short term equation		$st = 1$		$st = 2$	
Adjustment to equilibrium					
	$\alpha_{s,st}$	-0.001	(0.927)	-0.001	(0.955)
	$\alpha_{f,st}$	-0.117	(0.001)	-0.083	(0.067)
Constant					
	$c_{s,st}$	0.002	(0.500)	-0.005	(0.474)
	$c_{f,st}$	0.005	(0.018)	-0.012	(0.055)
Effect of past S price variation					
	$\gamma_{ss,st}$	-0.142	(0.271)	0.075	(0.606)
	$\gamma_{fs,st}$	0.057	(0.640)	0.073	(0.456)
Effect of past F price variation					
	$\gamma_{sf,st}$	0.233	(0.113)	0.312	(0.014)
	$\gamma_{ff,st}$	-0.055	(0.693)	0.022	(0.881)
Variance equation		$st = 1$		$st = 2$	
Constant					
	$c_{11,st}$	0.010	(0.024)	0.035	(0.001)
	$c_{21,st}$	0.029	(0.001)	0.036	(0.001)
	$c_{22,st}$	0.030	(0.001)	0.044	(0.001)
Effect of past variance					
	$b_{11,st}$	0.229	(0.180)	0.001	(0.947)
	$b_{22,st}$	0.001	(0.862)	0.420	(0.025)
Effect of past shocks					
	$a_{11,st}$	0.286	(0.036)	0.612	(0.001)
	$a_{22,st}$	0.184	(0.154)	0.317	(0.068)
Effect of past negative shocks					
	$d_{11,st}$	0.323	(0.042)	0.670	(0.021)
	$d_{22,st}$	0.451	(0.004)	0.576	(0.017)
Transition probabilities					
	$Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 1\}$	0.949	(0.001)		
	$Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 2\}$	0.051	(0.001)		
	$Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 1\}$	0.124	(0.001)		
	$Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 2\}$	0.876	(0.001)		
Diagnostics					
	LogL	1.956×10^3			
	JB	0.440		0.500	
	Q(6)	0.195		0.464	
	Q ² (6)	0.044		0.644	

Note: N refers to cointegration procedure from Nielsen (2010). For each parameter, we mention the estimated coefficients and the P-value of the Student test in bracket. The coefficient is significant at the 10% – mentioned in bold –, 5% or 1% if P-value is less than 0.10, 0.05 or 0.01, respectively. LogL, JB, Q(6) and Q²(6) are the log-likelihood, the Jarque and Bera (1980) test for normality, the Ljung and Box (1978) test for autocorrelation and the ARCH test (Engle, 1982) for heteroskedasticity, respectively.

500 Concerning the short-term interactions between price changes ($\gamma_{ij,st}$), these two


501 markets seem to be disconnected during normal periods and only past changes of
502 futures prices have a significant impact on spot prices for the high volatility state
503 ($\gamma_{sf,2}$). This last result highlights the fact that futures market can help in under-
504 standing the ethanol spot price dynamics during periods of instability. Furthermore,
505 the short-term interaction is also regime-dependent, confirming again the ability of
506 our Markov-switching specification to describe it. However, the ethanol spot price
507 could be driven by physical drivers during normal periods, mainly oil and corn prices
508 (Chiou-Wei et al., 2019) and financial drivers during volatile periods.

509

510 Third, we now analyze results about the second moments equation as well as the
511 evolution of the volatility. The conditional variance equation is presented in the third
512 part of the Table 4. As expected, we note a high persistence degree ($a_{ii,st}^2 + b_{ii,st}^2$) of
513 the conditional variance during volatile periods ($st = 2$). This feature is common to
514 oil and gasoline markets (Fong and See, 2002; Alizadeh et al., 2008). During these
515 high volatile periods, each price variance is strongly affected by past price shocks
516 ($a_{11,2}$ and $a_{22,2}$ for spot and futures prices, respectively) and this effect persists in
517 the case of the futures markets as $b_{22,2}$ is significant. In addition, our specification
518 captures well the leverage effect with high and significant coefficients $d_{ii,st}$. Losses in
519 players' portfolio, i.e., negative shocks, have a greater impact on future conditional
520 variance than gains, i.e., positive shocks. Shocks have more effect on variance in the
521 high volatile periods for both positive and negative shocks.

522

Figure 3: Smoothed probabilities of being in a high volatility state



523 The second last part of the Table 4 provides probability to switch between regimes
524 or to stay in the previous states. In addition, Figure 3 presents the probability at
525 each time of being in the regime of high volatility.²⁵ The probability of switching
526 from high to low variance states ($Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 1\}$) is greater compared to the probability
527 of switching from low to high variance regimes ($Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 2\}$). This result indicates a
528 shorter duration for high volatility regimes and is confirmed by the average expected

²⁵We represent the smoothed probability which provides the best estimation of the states at each time using full-sample information. See Krolzig (1997) for further details on its calculation as well as on other existing probabilities.

529 state duration calculation proposed by Hamilton (1989).²⁶ Normal periods persist
530 approximately 19.6 weeks in average while high volatility periods last 8 weeks. We
531 can note that these periods last longer time than the oil market (Alizadeh et al.,
532 2008). The volatility regimes in the ethanol market seem to be quite stable. During
533 the 2008-2016 periods, only two main periods are characterized by succession of high
534 volatility events. The first one is mainly concentrated during 2008 and 2009 and
535 could be explained by several factors as the financial crisis, the fast development
536 of the ethanol production and consumption since 2005 or the creation of the RFS
537 program. The second period begins at the half 2013 and persists to the end of 2014.
538 A reasonable explanation of the volatility in the ethanol market at this time could
539 be the poor corn harvest in 2012 that could have impacted corn stock for ethanol
540 producers and then ethanol prices (Spencer et al., 2018).

541

Table 5: In-sample direct hedging simulation

	Var.	SVar.+	SVar.+ I.	SVar.-	SVar.- I.	Util.	VaR	E.S.
No Hedged	24.42	11.76	52.1	12.56	58.5	-9.770	83,425	118,307
Naive	12.33	6.397	12.0	5.904	11.7	-4.931	61,423	86,162
OLS	12.07	6.183	8.89	5.859	11.1	-4.827	64,888	86,345
MGarch	12.27	6.131	8.11	6.118	14.8	-4.909	64,103	89,250
Gjr-MGarch	12.14	6.076	7.27	6.044	13.8	-4.857	63,890	88,681
VAR-MGarch	12.24	6.211	9.29	6.006	13.2	-4.897	63,110	87,810
VAR-Gjr-MGarch	12.05	6.063	7.08	5.965	12.6	-4.821	62,649	87,439
VECM ^J -MGarch	12.16	6.152	8.42	5.979	12.8	-4.862	61,990	87,681
VECM ^J -Gjr-MGarch	11.97	5.987	5.90	5.956	12.5	-4.787	62,811	87,753
VECM ^N -MGarch	12.15	6.151	8.41	5.976	12.8	-4.860	61,996	87,712
VECM ^N -Gjr-MGarch	11.97	5.989	5.93	5.955	12.5	-4.787	62,844	87,785
Ms-MGarch	11.71	6.077	7.29	5.608	7.06	-4.684	59,481	83,798
Ms-Gjr-MGarch	11.39	5.873	4.07	5.493	5.12	-4.556	59,952	82,620
VAR-Ms-MGarch	11.40	5.989	5.93	5.389	3.28	-4.561	57,084	81,490
VAR-Ms-Gjr-MGarch	10.92	5.652	0.32	5.243	0.58	-4.367	54,263	81,503
VECM ^J -Ms-MGarch	11.33	5.963	5.52	5.340	2.39	-4.531	55,490	81,911
VECM ^J -Ms-Gjr-MGarch	10.87	5.634	-	5.212	-	-4.348	55,800	81,834
VECM ^N -Ms-MGarch	11.33	5.958	5.43	5.345	2.49	-4.531	55,603	81,978
VECM ^N -Ms-Gjr-MGarch	10.89	5.640	0.11	5.227	0.29	-4.356	55,168	81,932
Ms-VAR-MGarch	11.63	6.195	9.05	5.413	3.71	-4.653	55,848	81,567
Ms-VAR-Gjr-MGarch	11.40	6.047	6.82	5.327	2.16	-4.559	53,679	81,453
Ms-VECM ^J -MGarch	12.55	6.928	18.7	5.598	6.89	-5.021	61,127	83,684
Ms-VECM ^J -Gjr-MGarch	11.00	5.688	0.95	5.286	1.40	-4.399	54,133	81,704
Ms-VECM ^N -MGarch	11.54	6.076	7.28	5.437	4.13	-4.615	55,494	82,248
Ms-VECM ^N -Gjr-MGarch	10.99	5.677	0.76	5.292	1.52	-4.397	52,071	81,754

Note: Variance (Var.), positive and negative Semi-Variance (SVar.+ and SVar.-) are presented in 10^{-4} . Positive and negative semi-variance improvement (SVar.+ I. and SVar.- I.) measure the incremental semi-variance reduction of the best strategy versus the other strategies. Value-at-risk (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall (ES) are in US dollars for an initial investment of \$1 million. J and N refer to cointegration estimation from Johansen (1988) and Nielsen (2010), respectively.

542 Fourth, we can now study the hedging effectiveness of our different economic
543 specifications as well as the various markets used for cross-hedging strategy. Let
544 us remind that we compute the dynamic hedge ratios from conditional variance
545 equations apart from the naive ($\delta = 1$) and the OLS hedged ratio. These latter is
546 calculated as in Ederington (1979). Table 5 presents the various measures described
547 in section 4. Variance is provided to give an idea of the risk reduction. The pos-
548 itive and negative semi-variances allow us to highlight risk reduction for long and

²⁶The average expected duration of state 1 (resp. 2) can be calculated by $(Pr\{1 \Rightarrow 2\})^{-1}$ (resp. $(Pr\{2 \Rightarrow 1\})^{-1}$).

549 short hedgers, respectively. As we concentrate mainly our analysis on the ethanol
550 producers, we also provide the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall for these lat-
551 ter, i.e., ethanol producers. We don't detail results about direct hedging in sample
552 simulation as they only provide historical performance. Let us just mention that
553 (i) the model using cointegration with procedure from Johansen (1988), Markov
554 switching regime only applied on the conditional variance equations and asymmetric
555 volatility responses (VECM^J-Ms-Gjr-MGarch) is the best model for long and short
556 hedgers, (ii) minimal value-at-risk and expected shortfall – for short hedgers – are
557 however provided by Ms-VECM^N-Gjr-MGarch and Ms-VAR-Gjr-MGarch models,
558 respectively, and (iii) cross hedging strategies – presented in the Table 6 – have poor
559 performance compared to direct hedging highlighting stronger links between ethanol
560 spot and futures markets in term of second-order moment than with corn, oil and
561 gasoline futures markets.
562

Table 6: Best in-sample cross hedging simulation

	Gasoline	Corn	Oil
Var.	23.02	20.05	21.62
	Ms-Gjr-MGarch	VAR-Ms-Garch	Ms-Gjr-MGarch
SVar.+ (SVar.+ I.)	11.40 (50.6)	9.548 (40.4)	11.35 (50.4)
	Ms-Gjr-MGarch	VAR-Ms-Garch	Ms-VAR-Gjr-MGarch
SVar.- (SVar.- I.)	11.58 (55.0)	10.50 (50.4)	9.907 (47.4)
	Ms-Gjr-MGarch	OLS	Ms-Gjr-MGarch
VaR	76,963	77,280	67,788
	VAR-Gjr-MGarch	Ms-Gjr-MGarch	Ms-Gjr-MGarch
E.S.	113,303	112,039	102,339
	Ms-Gjr-MGarch	OLS	Ms-Gjr-MGarch

Note: Variance (Var.), positive and negative Semi-Variance (SVar.+ and SVar.-) are presented in 10^{-4} . Positive and negative semi-variance improvement (SVar.+ I. and SVar.- I.) measure the incremental semi-variance reduction of the best direct strategy versus the other strategies. Value-at-risk (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall (ES) are in US dollars for an initial investment of \$1 million. J and N refer to cointegration estimation from Johansen (1988) and Nielsen (2010), respectively.

563 Table 7 presents direct hedging results with out-of-sample simulations. We can
564 first note that all direct strategies are useful for hedging purposes as they outperform
565 the no hedged situation at a one percent significant level. Long and short hedgers
566 – i.e., ethanol blenders and producers, respectively – could thus use ethanol futures
567 markets to reduce their price risk exposures. The first ones could implement the
568 simplest strategy, with the naive hedge ratio of one, to reduce the semi-variance of
569 66.1%. Ethanol producers should improve their profit stability – with a reduction of
570 64.8% in the portfolio semi-variance – with the VECM^N-Gjr-MGarch model. Note
571 also that value-at-risk and expected shortfall are minimized by VECM^N-MGarch
572 and VAR-Gjr-MGarch, respectively. We should mention that the best strategy for
573 short hedgers does not provide significant improvement compared to other direct
574 hedging strategy. Ethanol producers could also use the naive hedge ratio in order
575 to reduce the semi-variance of their hedging portfolio by 59.4% compared to the
576 situation without hedging. The result about no significant improvement of Markov
577 switching models in comparison to naive model is in line with oil and heating oil
578 markets for short hedgers but not with gasoline markets (Alizadeh et al., 2008). In
579 addition, while Spencer et al. (2018) recommend the use of OLS based hedge ratio

580 outperforming the naive strategy during the turbulent periods, we argue that this
581 dynamic hedging strategy does not provide hedging improvements compared to the
582 use of a hedge ratio of 1. This latter strategy seems to improve – although without
583 significant difference – semi-variance of 5.74% (resp. 4.04%) in short hedgers (resp.
584 long hedgers) portfolios compared to OLS-based strategy and is the simplest tool.
585 However, this result could be due to the out-sample period used in this analysis, i.e.,
586 October 2016 to March 2018, as the ethanol market is mainly in normal periods de-
587 spite two months with low turbulence in the end of 2016 following the US presidential
588 election results.²⁷ Note also that, as static strategy becomes more effective compared
589 to complex specification as hedging horizon increases (Lien et al., 2016), the recom-
590 mendation about the use of the naive hedge ratio can be extended to hedging horizon
591 greater than one week. Finally, the use of the nonparametric cointegration procedure
592 from Nielsen (2010) provides no systematic and significant improvement in hedging
593 strategy in comparison to the usual tool from Johansen (1988).

594

Table 7: Out-sample direct hedging simulation

	Var.	SVar.+	SVar.+ I.	SVar.-	SVar.- I.	Util.	VaR	E.S.
No Hedged	11.51	5.211	66.1 ^a	6.164	64.8 ^a	-4.605	55,752	80,468
Naive	4.107	1.767	-***	2.291	5.36***	-1.643	43,957	54,215
OLS	4.332	1.841	4.04***	2.439	11.1***	-1.733	45,469	56,656
MGarch	4.119	1.827	3.31***	2.243	3.33***	-1.648	39,103	53,241
Gjr-MGarch	4.145	1.834	3.66***	2.261	4.12***	-1.658	39,943	53,801
VAR-MGarch	4.067	1.815	2.68***	2.203	1.59***	-1.627	39,067	53,207
VAR-Gjr-MGarch	4.018	1.799	1.80***	2.170	0.09***	-1.607	40,288	53,051
VECM ^J -MGarch	4.080	1.825	3.18***	2.206	1.71***	-1.632	39,061	53,207
VECM ^J -Gjr-MGarch	4.031	1.809	2.35***	2.172	0.19***	-1.612	40,558	53,147
VECM ^N -MGarch	4.071	1.822	3.04***	2.200	1.46***	-1.629	39,012	53,144
VECM ^N -Gjr-MGarch	4.030	1.813	2.54***	2.168	-***	-1.612	40,522	53,100
Ms-MGarch	4.438	1.838	3.90***	2.547	14.9***	-1.775	47,526	59,521
Ms-Gjr-MGarch	4.238	1.806	2.19***	2.381	8.95***	-1.695	47,346	57,537
VAR-Ms-MGarch	4.410	1.824	3.14***	2.535	14.5***	-1.764	48,607	60,477
VAR-Ms-Gjr-MGarch	4.314	1.802	1.96***	2.461	11.9***	-1.725	48,702	59,708
VECM ^J -Ms-MGarch	4.401	1.837	3.85***	2.511	13.7***	-1.760	47,223	59,962
VECM ^J -Ms-Gjr-MGarch	4.349	1.824	3.12***	2.473	12.3***	-1.740	48,297	60,025
VECM ^N -Ms-MGarch	4.427	1.854	4.71***	2.521	14.0***	-1.771	47,400	60,300
VECM ^N -Ms-Gjr-MGarch	4.350	1.835	3.73***	2.463	12.0***	-1.740	48,155	59,758
Ms-VAR-MGarch	4.322	1.797	1.70***	2.475	12.4***	-1.729	47,268	59,074
Ms-VAR-Gjr-MGarch	4.271	1.791	1.39***	2.429	10.7***	-1.708	47,099	58,616
Ms-VECM ^J -MGarch	4.292	1.875	5.76***	2.365	8.34***	-1.717	42,964	55,971
Ms-VECM ^J -Gjr-MGarch	4.326	1.835	3.74***	2.439	11.1***	-1.730	47,385	59,197
Ms-VECM ^N -MGarch	4.283	1.836	3.76***	2.396	9.52***	-1.713	44,735	57,531
Ms-VECM ^N -Gjr-MGarch	4.351	1.847	4.33***	2.452	11.6***	-1.740	47,498	59,577

Note: Variance (Var.), positive and negative Semi-Variance (SVar.+ and SVar.-) are presented in 10^{-4} . Positive and negative semi-variance improvement (SVar.+ I. and SVar.- I.) measure the incremental semi-variance reduction of the best strategy versus the other strategies. Value-at-risk (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall (ES) are in US dollars for an initial investment of \$1 million. J and N refer to Johansen (1988) and Nielsen (2010)'s cointegration estimation, respectively. ^a indicates that the best strategy outperforms the competing model at least a 10% significance level. Stars (*, **, ***) indicate that the strategy outperforms the no hedged strategy at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. The P-values are provided from White (2000)'s reality check using the stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994). VaR and expected shortfall (E.S.) are in US dollars for an initial investment of \$1 million. J and N refer to cointegration estimation from Johansen (1988) and Nielsen (2010), respectively.

²⁷Some events during this election impacted financial markets in various sectors including the alternative energy sector (Pham et al., 2018).

595 Last but not least, Table 8 provides main results about out-of-sample simula-
596 tion with cross hedging strategy. The best direct strategies founded in terms of
597 positive and negative semi-variance, i.e., with hedge ratios from naive and VECM^N-
598 Gjr-MGarch strategies, respectively, outperform all cross hedging strategy at least
599 a 10% significance level. Note that this result holds using the naive hedge ratio for
600 short hedgers. The ethanol futures market is thus the best one to use for hedge
601 purpose in line with Dahlgran (2009) who only compares effectiveness of ethanol and
602 gasoline futures markets. In addition, gasoline and oil futures markets seem to be in-
603 efficient for ethanol hedging activity as they do not provide significant improvements
604 in semi-variance for long and short hedgers. However, corn futures market seems to
605 be able to reduce price risks exposure with the naive strategy as it provides signifi-
606 cant improvements compared to situation without hedging. However, this result is
607 only valid for long hedgers, i.e., ethanol blenders.
608

Table 8: Best out-sample cross hedging simulation

	Gasoline	Corn	Oil
Var. (V. I.)	12.07 Var-MGarch	10.26 Ms-MGarch	11.68 Ms-VAR-Gjr-MGarch
SVar.+ (SVar.+ I.)	4.965 (64.4 ^a) MGarch	4.115 (57.1 ^{a*}) Naive	5.066 (65.1 ^a) OLS
SVar.- (SVar.- I.)	6.744 (67.9 ^a) OLS	6.001 (63.9 ^a) Ms-Gjr-MGarch	6.328 (65.7 ^a) Ms-VAR-Gjr-MGarch
VaR	56,486 OLS	57,058 OLS	53,891 OLS
E.S.	85,306 VECM ^N -MGarch	83,792 OLS	83,821 VAR-MGarch

Note: Variance (Var.), positive and negative Semi-Variance (SVar.+ and SVar.-) are presented in 10^{-4} . Positive and negative semi-variance improvement (SVar.+ I. and SVar.- I.) measure the incremental semi-variance reduction of the best strategy versus the other strategies. Value-at-risk (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall (ES) are in US dollars for an initial investment of \$1 million. J and N refer to Johansen (1988) and Nielsen (2010)'s cointegration estimation, respectively. ^a indicates that the best strategy outperforms the competing model at least a 10% significance level. Stars (*, **, ***) indicate that the strategy outperforms the no hedged strategy at a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. The P-values are provided from White (2000)'s reality check using the stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994). VaR and expected shortfall (E.S.) are in US dollars for an initial investment of \$1 million. J and N refer to cointegration estimation from Johansen (1988) and Nielsen (2010), respectively.

609 6 Conclusion

610
611 Recall that the ethanol sector is a growing market since 2005, that the ethanol
612 producers face to thin profit margin and do not seem to use financial tools to re-
613 duce their price risks exposure, we propose an extensive study of this market with
614 a particular focus on the spot and futures prices relationship. We thus analyze the
615 ethanol prices dynamics in the US from 2008 to 2016 in terms of (i) long-term re-
616 lationship, (ii) short-term prices dynamics, (iii) behaviors of the volatility and (iv)
617 hedging abilities. These four first points are explored with a Markov-switching vec-
618 tor error correction model with an asymmetric Garch error structure. For the last

619 one, we also apply a wide range of econometric specifications to provide the best
620 strategy for direct hedging strategy as well as using corn, gasoline and oil futures
621 markets to analyze cross hedging opportunities. In addition, we study the ability
622 of the nonparametric cointegration procedure from Nielsen (2010) to improve hedge
623 ratio estimation.

624

625 Our results show that the ethanol market is characterized by its efficiency – in
626 the sense of the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis –, despite the lack of a
627 clear price-discovery process from futures to spot prices in the long-term, as well as
628 the absence of backwardation and contango. In addition, ethanol spot and futures
629 markets is quite different from other energy markets with no responsiveness of the
630 spot price during period of long-term disequilibrium as well as a disconnection be-
631 tween these two markets during normal periods. However, the futures price leads
632 the spot price during high volatile periods. Furthermore, these latter are mainly
633 concentrated in 2008-2009 and 2013-2014. Finally, we highlight the ability of the
634 ethanol futures market to reduce price risks exposure with the simplest strategy, i.e.,
635 the naive hedge ratio of one, for ethanol producers and blenders. And, while corn
636 futures market could be used by ethanol blenders to hedge purpose – in a less extent
637 than the ethanol futures market –, it’s the only cross hedging strategy providing
638 significant improvement compared to the situation without hedging. Note also that
639 our analysis fails to highlight significant improvement of the cointegration framework
640 from Nielsen (2010) compared to Johansen (1988) in term of hedge ratio estimation
641 despite the fact that it provides the best explanatory model.

642

643 This article is thus of great interest for ethanol sector as we show that the ethanol
644 futures price provides an unbiased estimator of the future spot price, gives informa-
645 tion of future spot price changes during high volatile periods and is an useful tool
646 to reduce price risks exposure for market participants. However, we should keep in
647 mind that the ethanol spot price seem to be mainly driven by physical factors during
648 normal periods as related commodities market or environmental policies. In addition,
649 we go further than Spencer et al. (2018) who summarize the better performance of
650 the OLS based hedge ratio compared to complex econometric tools with “*the simple
651 is better*” expression. Indeed, we highlight the ability of the naive strategy to provide
652 best – or at least the same – hedging performance.

653

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