JOHANNA ETNER

Professeur(e)

Photo Johanna Etner
  • Email
  • Phone professional

    0140974085

  • Office in Paris Nanterre

    G603B

  • Research group

      Comportements, Droits et Bien-être

  • Theme(s)
    • Economie de la santé
    • Risque et incertitude
    • Economie de l'environnement
    • Comportement économique
2018-32

Male reproductive health, fairness and optimal policies

Johanna Etner, Natacha Raffin, Thomas Seegmuller

Abstract
Based on epidemiological evidence, we consider an economy where agents differ through their ability to procreate. Households with impaired fertility may incur health expenditures to increase their chances of parenthood. This health heterogeneity generates welfare inequalities that deserve to be ruled out. We explore three different criteria of social evaluation in the long-run: the utilitarian approach, which considers the wellbeing of all households, the ex-ante egalitarian criterion, which considers the expected well-being of the worst-off social group, and the ex-post egalitarian one, which only considers the realized well-being of the worstoff. In an overlapping generations model, we propose a set of economic instruments to decentralize each solution. To correct for the externality and inequalities, both a preventive (a taxation of capital) and a redistributive policy are required.
Mot(s) clé(s)
Reproductive health; Fairness; Egalitarianism; Optimal policy; OLG model
2016-36

The falling sperm counts story": A limit to growth?

Johanna Etner, Natacha Raffin, Thomas Seegmuller

Abstract
We develop an overlapping generations model of growth, in which agents differ through their ability to procreate. Based on epidemiological evidence, we assume that pollution is a cause of this health heterogeneity, affecting sperm quality. Nevertheless, agents with impaired fertility may incur health treatments in order to increase their chances of parenthood. In this set-up, we analyse the dynamic behaviour of the economy and characterise the situation reached in the long run. Then, we determine the optimal solution that prevails when a social planner maximises a Millian utilitarian criterion and propose a set of available economic instruments to decentralise the optimal solution. We underscore that to correct for both the externalities of pollution and the induced-health inefficiency, it is necessary to tax physical capital while it requires to overall subsidy mostly harmed agents within the economy. Hence, we argue that fighting against the sources of an altered reproductive health is more relevant than directly inciting agents to incur health treatments.
Mot(s) clé(s)
Pollution; Growth; Fertility; Health.
2013-30

Illiquid Life Annuities

Johanna Etner, Hippolyte d'ALBIS

Abstract
In this article, we consider illiquid life annuity contracts and show that they may be preferred to Yaari (1965)'s liquid contracts. In an overlapping-generation economy, liquid life annuities are demanded only if the equilibrium is dynamically inefficient. Alternatively, an equilibrium displaying a positive demand for illiquid life annuities is efficient. In this latter case, the welfare at steady-state is larger if illiquid life annuity contracts are available.
Mot(s) clé(s)
annuity, overlapping generation model
2012-33

Underestimation of probability modifications: characterization and economic implications

Johanna Etner, Meglena Jeleva

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose a behavioral characterization of individuals who underestimate probability modifications and to characterize this behavior in the standard preferences representation models under risk (Expected utility, Dual theory, Rank Dependant Utility Theory and MaxMin Expected Utility). Our main results are the following. Underreaction to probability modifications is in general independent from standard risk aversion and prudence. In models involving probability transformation functions, it is characterized by the slope of the probability transformation function. In the MaxMin Expected utility model under risk, it is related to the weights of the maximal and minimal consequences in the preferences representation function. Considering a simple prevention decision, consisting in the reduction of the probability of a monetary loss, we show that individuals who underreact to probability modifications invest less in prevention than individuals who objectively evaluate these modifications. Underreaction to probability modification is thus a possible explanation for low investment in prevention.
Mot(s) clé(s)
probability perception; non expected utility; prevention
2008-25

Bankable Pollution Permits under Uncertainty and Optimal Risk Management Rules: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Julien Chevallier, Johanna Etner, Pierre-André Jouvet

Abstract
The well known economic advantage of tradable permits over command
and control obviously vanishes if firms do not trade because of regulatory
uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty about political decision changes in the permits
program could make firms reluctant to participate in tradable permits
markets. Based on a two-period partial equilibrium framework, our results
suggest that the banking provisions may be used as a tool of policy risk control
and that it is possible to define optimal risk sharing rules in order to
respond to political decision changes. Finally, our empirical discussion attempts
to put the theoretical results concerning firms' banking and pooling
behaviors in the context of the recent development of the European Union
Emisions Trading scheme (EU ETS).
Mot(s) clé(s)
Firm behavior; Tradable permits; Policy risk; EU ETS
2006-7

Stockage des permis de pollution en incertitude et règle de partage optimal de risques

Johanna Etner, Pierre-André Jouvet

Abstract
The well known economic advantage of tradable permits over command and control obviously vanish if firms do not trade because of policy uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty about changes in the permits program could make firms reluctant to invest in tradable permits. This article proposes to give optimal risk sharing rules in order to respond to policy risk. We show how banking of tradable permits can be used as a tool of policy risk control.
Mot(s) clé(s)
firm behavior, tradable permits, policy risk
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