SAÏD SOUAM

Professeur(e)

Photo Saïd Souam
  • Email
  • Phone professional

    0140977824

  • Office in Paris Nanterre

    G307B

  • Research group

      Transitions, Environnement, Énergie, Institutions, Territoires

  • Theme(s)
    • Politique et droit de la concurrence
    • Criminalité, délinquance
    • Economie du développement
    • Droit et économie
    • Finances publiques
    • Histoire économique
2021-26

Economie du travail en prison : enjeux, résultats et recommandations

Benjamin Monnery, Anna Montagutelli, Saïd Souam

Abstract
In France as in other countries, prison faces the challenge of securing inmates' reentry and preventing recidivism. Theoretically, prison work offers a direct opportunity to improve reentry prospects, but only one quarter of prisoners have access to work today in France, compared to 36% twenty years ago. This article provides a summary of the challenges at stake with prison work. It reviews the theoretical and empirical research on the impacts of rehabilitation programs and discusses the potentiel effects of prison work on social welfare. The article also makes the case that the supply of prison work and public spending in this area are insufficient in France, considering the externalities involved. Finally, the article develops public policy recommendations for prison work to deliver its full potential.
Mot(s) clé(s)
prison ; work ; reentry ; recidivism ; public policies
2018-14

Multivariate Periodic Stochastic Volatility Models: Applications to Algerian dinar exchange rates and oil prices modeling

Nadia Boussaha, Faycal Hamdi, Saïd Souam

Abstract
The contribution of this paper is twofold. In a first step, we propose the so called Periodic Multivariate Autoregressive Stochastic Volatility (PV ARSV) model, that allows the Granger causality in volatility in order to capture periodicity in stochastic conditional variance. After a thorough discussion, we provide some probabilistic properties of this class of models. We thus propose two methods for the estimation problem, one based on the periodic Kalman filter and the other on the particle filter and smoother with Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm. In a second step, we propose an empirical application by modeling oil price and three exchange rates time series. It turns out that our modeling gives very accurate results and has a well volatility forecasting performance.
Mot(s) clé(s)
Multivariate periodic stochastic volatility; periodic stationarity; periodic Kalman filter; particle filtering; exchange rates; Saharan Blend oil.
2017-35

Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power

Patricia Charléty, Marie-Cécile Fagart, Saïd Souam

Abstract
This paper characterizes the equilibria of a costly voting game in which shareholders heterogeneous in both size and preferences strategically vote for or against a proposed resolution or withhold. It is shown that a minimum quorum generates (1) equilibria in which one or several shareholders form voting coalitions in favor of the resolution that is adopted (2) an equilibrium in which shareholders strategically abstain from voting and the resolution is rejected. The size of blockholders and their preferences (in favor or against the resolution) play a crucial role in the existence of equilibria, their nature, the size and the number of voters in coalitions. We derive conditions under which the dominant shareholder controls the meeting. We also examine how large shareholders influence the result of the vote. In particular, we analyze the interaction between blockholders and discuss the situations in which large shareholders jointly control annual meetings or form coalitions to counter the dominant shareholder.
Mot(s) clé(s)
Shareholder Meeting, Strategic voting, Coalitions, Quorum rule, Dominant, Controlling and Reference shareholders.
2012-9

Commitments in Antitrust

Philippe Choné, Saïd Souam, Arnold Vialfont

Abstract
Competition agencies have the power to close an antitrust case in return for the commitment to end the alleged infringement. We examine how such a procedure affects deterrence and consumer welfare. We first show that it lowers the deterrent effect of competition policy. However, under asymmetric information, commitments may enhance consumer surplus with shortened proceedings and avoidance of trial type-II errors. The variation of consumer harm w.r.t. the firm's gain from the practice determines the optimal usage frequency of this negotiation tool. Finally, we show that trial and commitments may be complements as the latter is not always an answer to a lack of efficiency of the agency.
Mot(s) clé(s)
Commitments in antitrust, Plea bargaining, Consumer Surplus
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