Photo Benjamin Monnery

Benjamin Monnery

Maître de conférences
  • Email
  • Tél. professionnel 0140977016
  • Bureau à Paris Nanterre (Bât. + num.) G308A
  • Research group

      Droit, Institutions, Règlementation et Interactions Stratégiques

  • Theme(s)
    • Droit et économie
    • Economie du crime
    • Economie politique et constitutionnelle

2020-12 "Qualité des études d'impact et travail parlementaire"

Benjamin Monnery, Bertrand du Marais

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Abstract
Since 2009, the French Government is required to produce a regulatory impact assessment (RIA) of the bills introduced in the Parliament, in order to document ex-ante their legal, economic, social or environmental consequences. This article proposes a statistical analysis of a sample of thirty impact assessments published from june 2017 to august 2019, representing about half of the new bills over this period. First, the article documents the heterogeneous and often mediocre quality of impact assessments through a series of indicators, and attempts to identify the determinants of such quality. Second, the article investigates the use of RIA by parliamentarians under the current 15th legislature and shows that, while this use is limited and mostly driven by opposition parties, better RIA can definitely contribute to parliamentary work. Finally, the reasons for the relatively poor quality of RIA and ways for improvement are discussed.
Classification-JEL
D61 ; D78 ; H70
Mot(s) clé(s)
regulatory impact assessments ; ex-ante evaluation ; Parliament ; Government
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2019-20 "Prison, Semi-Liberty and Recidivism: Bounding Causal Effects in a Survival Model"

Anaïs Henneguelle, Benjamin Monnery, François-Charles Wolff

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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of semi-liberty as an alternative to prison on recidivism in France. Our analysis is based on a unique dataset comprising 1,445 offenders, all eligible to semi-liberty. In the absence of an instrumental variable affecting access to semi-liberty but unrelated to recidivism, we turn to selection-on-observable methods as well as sensitivity analyses to bound the causal effect of interest. Our results under treatment exogeneity (Cox regressions) and conditional independence (matching) show that semi-liberty is associated with a reduction of 22% to 31% in offenders’ hazard of recidivism in the five years after release. The estimated effects decrease, but remain negative and significant when credible confounders are introduced. Overall, our analysis lends strong support for a beneficial effect of semi-liberty compared to prison.
Classification-JEL
K14;K42;C18
Mot(s) clé(s)
Recidivism, semi-liberty, halfway houses, prison, survival analyses, sensitivity analyses
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2019-7 "Les déterminants locaux de la participation numérique au Grand débat national : une analyse économétrique"

Hamza Bennani, Pauline Gandré, Benjamin Monnery

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Abstract
This paper analyses the local determinants of the electronic participation to the "Grand débat". First, we highlight the spatial heterogeneity of the participants using their zip code. Second, we use an econometric approach to assess the local determinants of the general participation and the participation on each of the four topics of the "Grand débat". The results show that the median standard of living and the education level are the main determinants of the general participation, whereas some specific variables explain the participation of each of the four topics.
Classification-JEL
C21, D72
Mot(s) clé(s)
Grand débat, electronic participation, local determinants
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2018-21 "Can Public and Private Sanctions Discipline Politicians? Evidence from the French Parliament"

Maxime Le Bihan, Benjamin Monnery

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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of sanctions on the behavior of deputies in the French National Assembly. In 2009, the Assembly introduced small monetary sanctions to prevent absenteeism in weekly standing committee meetings (held on wednesday mornings). Using a rich monthly panel dataset of parliamentary activity for the full 2007-2012 legislature, we study the reactions of deputies to (i) the mere eligibility to new sanctions, (ii) the actual experience of a salary cut, and (iii) the public exposure of sanctioned deputies in the media. First, our diff-in-diff estimates show very large disciplining effects of the policy in terms of committee attendance, and positive or null effects on other dimensions of parliamentary work. Second, exploiting the timing of exposure to actual sanctions (monthly salary cuts versus staggered media exposure), we find that deputies strongly increase their committee attendance both after the private experience of sanctions and after their public exposure. These results suggest that monetary and reputational incentives can effectively discipline politicians without crowding out intrinsic motivation.
Classification-JEL
D72; D78; J45; K42
Mot(s) clé(s)
political economy; political accoutability; sanctions; reputation; motivation
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